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I. INTRODUCTION
For the better part of thirty years, corporate and other interests
bent on avoiding responsibility for their misdeeds have led a battle to
"reform" the civil justice system in a manner that tilts the legal play-
ing field substantially and shamelessly in their favor. Acting under
the umbrellas of various "citizens" groups, such as the American Tort
Reform Association, the Civil Justice League, and Citizens Against
Lawsuit Abuse, these business interests have sought to scale back
the rights of American consumers by heightening negligence stan-
dards, abolishing centuries-old legal doctrines, capping damage
awards, and instituting other reforms that effectively deny the
American public access to the courts.
* Robert S. Peck is Senior Director for Legal Affairs and Policy Research at the As.
sociation of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), Washington, D.C., and an adjunct professor
at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, D.C. B.A., George Wash-
ington University, Washington, D.C., 1975; J.D., Cleveland State University, Cleveland,
Ohio/New York University, New York, New York, 1978; LL.M., Yale Law School, New Ha-
ven, Connecticut, 1990.
** Richard Marshall is Research Analyst for ATLA, Washington, D.C. B.A., Univer-
sity of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, 1989; A.M., University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois,
1992; Ph.D. (Political Science), University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, 1996.
*** Kenneth D. Kranz is a sole practitioner, Tallahassee, Florida and has served as a
lobbyist and Special Legislative Counsel for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Talla-
hassee, Florida, since 1987. B.S., Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, 1970;
J.D., Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, 1975.
398 FLORIDA STA TE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:397
Using their political muscle and a nonstop propaganda machine
to create a false impression about "runaway juries" and to demon-
ize lawyers who work for ordinary people, they have manufactured
myths and anecdotes about supposed cases with the singular pur-
pose of furthering their political agenda by enraging the public
over a civil justice system supposedly gone awry. The tales they
tell, though, have little relationship to the facts. Two scholars from
the American Bar Foundation found:
Underlying this promise for legal reform are the familiar refrains
of a litigation explosion, a lawsuit crisis, a liability crisis, an insur-
ance crisis, skyrocketing jury awards, unscrupulous attorneys, and
on, and on. This legal system run amok is blamed for everything
from the unavailability of essential health care and medicines, the
loss of business competitiveness in the world economy and the con-
comitant effects on economic well-being and jobs, to the closing of
public parks and the demise of high school football. These costs
and others are presented as a justification for immediate, funda-
mental reform in the civil justice system ....
... We are skeptical of the efficacy of many proposed and en-
acted reforms, and we are concerned about the consequences of
those measures. Beyond the self-interest of those groups lobbying
for reform, we can see little reason for endorsing this reform
agenda. We come to this position after spending a number of years
collecting and analyzing data on civil jury verdicts from different
parts of the country. We-and others--do not find empirical evi-
dence of a system run amok with skyrocketing awards, and so on.
Or, we find little or no empirical information available regarding
many of the claims made by the reformers about juries and the
civil justice system.'
Others have expended great effort to track down the stories told
by these "tort reformers" and have found the renderings to be noth-
ing less than substantial distortions calculated to advance political
goals. For example, University of Wisconsin law professor, Marc Gal-
anter, has investigated some of the most frequently used examples of
supposedly indefensible case results and found, upon review of the
actual facts, the cases reached entirely logical ends.2
The distorted discourse on the civil justice system has also moved
beyond such traditional fora for political rhetoric as editorials, op-
eds, and sympathetic talk-show hosts. It now finds expression in
what these groups routinely brandish as "scholarship." Politically
motivated conservative think tanks such as the Manhattan Institute,
1. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
ix-x (1995).
2. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in He): Contemporary Legends About the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 717, 726-31 (1998) (setting forth stories of lawsuits that
were publicized in a misleading manner).
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the Hudson Institute, and the Beacon Hill Institute; and polemical
writers such as Peter Huber and Walter Olson publish works of du-
bious scholarship that are passed off as authoritative commentaries
on a supposedly out-of-control civil justice system.
Unfortunately, these works are often taken at face value by un-
critical members of the press, politicians and political groups looking
to justify their own preconceived policy objectives, and a public that
often has no means to obtain better information. In fact, much of the
tort reformers' arguments have saturated the public to such an ex-
tent that many prospective jurors come to court with the mistaken
belief that plaintiffs, who have suffered serious injury as a result of
another's negligence, are merely out to enrich themselves at the ex-
pense of an unlucky, deep-pocketed corporation.3
Others have noted this trend as well. According to information
culled from court reporters in personal injury suits, juries sided with
plaintiffs 52% of the time in 1992, down from 61% in 1987.4 Plaintiffs'
success in product liability jury trials dropped from 54% in 1987 to
43% in 1992, and in cases concerning consumer products, that suc-
cess dropped from 55% to 39% in the same time period. 5 Plaintiffs'
success in medical malpractice cases has not been any better, with
plaintiffs prevailing in only 25% of cases against doctors in 1992,
down from 42% in 1987.6 The reasons for this drop are clear, accord-
ing to one expert:
Jury specialists say the powerful and deep-pocketed advocates of
reform have spread their message so successfully in the media that
juries have changed their behavior. "The publicity of the business
and insurance groups has played a major role in shifting both pub-
lic and judge opinion," says Theodore Eisenberg, a professor at
Cornell Law School. "Either there was a liability crisis or people
got sold one, and attitudes changed in a way that led to more vic-
tories for defendants. 7
Given the overwhelming evidence offered by independent scholars
that there was no litigation explosion, it is clear that the people did,
in fact, get sold one.8 More serious scholarship, written primarily by
3. See Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business Litigation,
79 JUDICATURE 242, 244-45 (Mar.-Apr. 1996) (stating how skeptical jurors often "blamed
the victim"); see also Edward Felsenthal, Juries Display Less Sympathy in Injury Claims,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1994, at B1; Amy Singer, Selecting Jurors: What to Do About Bias,
TRIAL (Apr. 1996) at 29.
4. See Felsenthal, supra note 3, at B1.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. A study done by a jury consulting firm found that 75% of jurors believe that
awards are too large, and two-thirds say there are too many lawsuits. See id. Another
study found that when exposed to an insurance company advertisement complaining about
large jury awards, mock jurors awarded significantly less pain-and-suffering damages than
2000]
400 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:397
disinterested academic observers, has shown how bereft of rigor and
validity the tort reformers' research truly is. Contrary to the claims
that are made, the empirical evidence amply demonstrates that there
is no litigation explosion,9 and juries do not act irrationally or preju-
dicially against wealthy defendants in awarding damages."0 In fact,
studies demonstrate that awards, all things being equal, are no more
or less consistent "if the defendant is a health care provider or the
negligent driver of an automobile."1 The bottom line is that the jury
verdicts are not influenced by the availability of "deep pockets."
One would hope that the appearance of systematic scholarship
debunking the work of pro-tort reform scholars would put an end to
their specious arguments and occasional legislative successes. Unfor-
tunately, that is not the case. Rather than focus on provable facts,
the tort reform propaganda is recycled from state to state, and the
troublesome reality that reputable scholars have discredited it is ei-
ther ignored or rationalized.
The Florida Legislature also bought the bill of goods being sold by
tort reformers and adopted the rhetoric of the majority's political pa-
trons in attempting to justify legislation. When Governor Jeb Bush
signed House Bill 775 into law on May 26, 1999,12 the business com-
munity finally achieved its goal of securing the most far-reaching leg-
islative restriction of citizens' and consumers' rights in more than a
decade. This year's victory was the culmination of a three-year legis-
lative battle that had raged in and out of the halls of the legislature
and marked the first comprehensive tort reform legislation enacted
into law since the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986.11 The en-
actment was a tribute to raw power, as first the Senate, then the
House of Representatives, and finally the Governor's Office changed
hands and the new officeholders felt an obligation to reward the
those mock jurors who did not see the advertisement. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insurance
Advertising and JuryAwards, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1979, at 69-70.
9. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 238-43; see also Marc Galanter, Real
World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 U. MD. L. REV. 1093, 1103 (1996) (stating that
the number of civil lawsuits per capita that has been filed is lower than at previous times
in the nation's history).
10. See Hans, supra note 3, at 248; see also DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 238-
43; VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 160-63 (1986); NEIL VIDMAR,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY
INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 193-202 (1995); Mi-
chael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anec-
dotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 86 (1992) (explaining why empirical evi-
dence does not support the theory that juries grant larger damage awards against wealth-
ier defendants).
11. Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving
Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 908
(1994) (footnote omitted).
12. Fla. HB 775 (1999) (Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400).
13. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695.
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business community that had so assiduously supported them. The
result was that a longstanding business wish list of legal changes
was enacted.' 4
Unfortunately for the business community, there was absolutely
no factual basis to claim that legal relief from liability was necessary.
Florida was not experiencing an insurance crisis, a litigation explo-
sion, or a declining economy. In fact, objective data showed just the
contrary.'5 Therefore, as part of their public relations plan, the busi-
ness community adopted the rhetorical device of claiming that legal
liability amounted to a "tort tax" that was exacted upon all Floridi-
ans. Specious research from the national tort reform movement was
the only empirical evidence presented to the legislature in support of
tort reform.
In Parts II through III, this Article will briefly examine House Bill
775 and its genesis, and then trace the bill through the legislative
process that eventually enacted it as law. It will also look at some of
the key provisions of the bill and their effects on tort litigation. Part
IV of this Article will place the issue of tort reform in the context of
constitutional requirements. Finally, Parts V through VIII will criti-
cally review the so-called scholarship used to justify tort reform. It
will look at studies used to support the passage of Florida tort reform
laws and point out their fallacies.
J
II. THE JOURNEY TO FLORIDA "TORT REFORM"
The efforts of the business community and the legislature that
culminated in 1999 took three legislative sessions to bear fruit. In
1997, legislation was considered but not passed.'6 In 1998, legislation
was passed, but vetoed.'7 And, in 1999, legislation was passed and
signed into law.'8 The provisions of these three sweeping pieces of
legislation are compared in detail in the appendix to this Article.
Late in the 1997 Legislative Session, the House Committee on Fi-
nancial Services took up a proposed committee bill that was entitled
the "Florida Accountability and Individual Responsibility (FAIR) Li-
ability Act."'9 The bill, which included a variety of tort reforms, was
taken up and passed out of committee in record time amidst an un-
14. See generally Kenneth D. Kranz, Tort Reform 1997-98: Profits v. PeopleZ 25 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 161 (1998) (providing a brief overview of the history behind recent "tort re-
form" efforts in Florida).
15. See id. at 182.
16. See Fla. HB 2117 (1997) (proposed amendment to chs. 95, 768, 772 (1997)).
17. See Fla. CS for SB 874 (1998).
18. See Fla. HB 775 (1999) (Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, 1999 Fla. Laws
1400).
19. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., PCB 97-06 (1997) (proposed Fla. HB 2117 (1997)).
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usually heavy-handed display of legislative strong-arming. 0 Among
other things, House Bill 2117 included a statute of repose for product
liability cases, the elimination of the owner's vicarious liability for
the use of any personal property by someone other than the owner,
limitations on punitive damages, and a further restriction on the ap-
plication of the doctrine of joint and several liability." Under the
House Rules in effect at the time, House Bill 2117 was carried over
and left pending for consideration during the 1998 Session.
2
In the new session, Senate President Toni Jennings created the
Senate Select Committee on Litigation Reform and charged it with
the following mission:
The ... select committee will conduct hearings to assess the man-
ner and extent to which the current civil litigation environment is
affecting economic development and job-creation efforts in the
state. The select committee will determine what civil litigation re-
forms would enhance the economic development climate of the
state while continuing to preserve the constitutional guarantees
citizens have to seek redress through the courts.2 3
Both the House Judiciary Committee, previously uninvolved with
the issue, and the new Senate committee conducted hearings
throughout the fall and winter of 1997-98. During these hearings,
Tort Reform United Effort (TRUE), a coalition of business associa-
tions and other pro-tort reform interests, unveiled with great fanfare
the results of an "economic study" it had commissioned. 4 The study,
which became known as the Fishkind Report, has been criticized by
economist Frederick Raffa for making naked and unsubstantiated
claims that Florida's tort liability system costs each Floridian $655
per year,2" that House Bill 2117 would reduce the volume of tort liti-
20. See Kranz, supra note 14, at 169 n.34 (providing a detailed description of the han-
dling of this bill).
21. See Fla. HB 2117, §§ 2, 3, 6-8 (1997). See Appendix for a complete listing of the
provisions of this bill.
22. Under Rule 96 of the 1996-98 House Rules, bills were carried over from the first
session of a legislative biennium to the next. This rule is no longer in effect. See FLA. H.R.
RULE 96 (1996-98).
23. Press Release from Office of the Fla. S. Pres. Toni Jennings (Aug. 14, 1997) (de-
tailing the mission of, and reasons for creating, the Select Committee on Litigation Re-
form) (copy on file with authors).
24. See Fishkind & Assocs., Inc., The Economic Impact of Tort Reform in Florida: An
Analysis of HB 2117, the Florida Accountability and Individual Responsibility (FAIR) Li.
ability Act 1997, (Oct. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Fishkind Report] (unpublished report, copy on
file with authors). See also infra Part V (discussing the Fishkind Report in greater detail).
Press release from Tort Reform United Effort, Media Advisory (Oct. 27, 1997) "TRUE Coa-
lition Details Economic Impact of Tort Reform in Florida," (providing notice of a press con-
ference to be held the following day) (copy on file with authors).
25. In contrast, economist Frederick Raffs found that the cost of liability insurance
per capita in Florida, in 1991, was $156 and $203 in 1995. See Frederick A. Raffs, Ph.D.,
Comments on the Economic Analysis Contained in the Economic Impact Report Prepared
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gation in Florida and lower litigation costs, and that House Bill 2117
could reasonably be expected to lower tort costs in Florida by $1 bil-
lion.2 6 TRUE immediately began trumpeting that "abusive lawsuits
costs every Floridian $655 annually,"27 an outlandish exaggeration
and little more than an advocate's fantasy to support a political
agenda.28 The report's principal author subsequently and implausibly
opined that the $1 billion savings per year "translates into an in-
crease of over 28,000 jobs, $470,000,000 in income and
$1,475,000,000 in total sales." 29 The report became the most impor-
tant, if not exclusive, source of the notion that the tort reforms under
consideration would have a positive impact on Florida's economy.
The 1997-1998 hearings led to several new bills being filed for the
1998 Session. 30 The House Civil Justice & Claims Committee divided
up the various issues and addressed them in separate committee
bills. The House bills included House Bill 3871, relating to products
liability; House Bill 3873, relating to punitive damages; House Bill
3875, relating to premises liability; House Bill 3879, relating to com-
parative fault and joint and several liability; and House Bill 3881, re-
lating to a variety of procedural reforms.31 Once introduced, all of the
House bills went straight to the floor and were passed out of the
House early in the session.
The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Litigation Re-
form, Senator John M. McKay, (Bradenton, Repub.) filed Senate Bill
874, which combined the Select Committee's recommendations into a
single bill.32 Senate Bill 874 was referred directly to the Senate Rules
Committee (bypassing the Senate Judiciary Committee), which
by Fishkind & Associates, Inc. for Tort Reform United Effort 3 (unpublished report, copy
on file with authors).
26. Fishkind Report, supra note 24.
27. Press release from Tort Reform United Effort, (Oct. 28, 1997), "TRUE Business
Coalition Details Economic Impact of Tort Reform in Florida" (outlining findings presented
at press conference) (copy on file with authors).
28. There are numerous methodological and other problems with this "research," not
the least of which is that the report's authors equate tort costs with insurance premiums
on a dollar-for-dollar basis and fail to consider any of the numerous benefits of the tort sys-
tem and other costs that would be incurred without it. See infra Part V (discussing prob-
lems with this research).
29. Letter to Senator John McKay from Henry Fishkind (Dec. 10, 1997) (attachment
to December 18, 1997, memorandum from Greg Krasovsky, Staff Director of the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Litigation Reform to all Select Committee members) (copy on file with
authors).
30. Technically, House Bill 2117 was also still before the Legislature. See supra note
22 and accompanying text. However, the Legislature took no action on House Bill 2117 in
1998.
31. See Fla. HB 3871 (1998); Fla. HB 3873 (1998); Fla. -B 3875 (1998); Fla. HB 3879
(1998); Fla. HB 3881 (1998).
32. Under the Senate Rules, the Select Committee did not have the authority to file a
committee bill. See FLA. S. RULE 2.39 (1996-1998).
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adopted a committee substitute for the bill.33 The full Senate passed
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 874 almost a month after the
House had taken up its bills.
The subsequent Conference Committee Report on Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 874, like its predecessor, House Bill 2117,
addressed joint and several liability, punitive damages, a products li-
ability statute of repose, and vicarious liability (limited, however, to
vicarious liability only with regard to the operation of motor vehicles
rather than to all types of personal property).14 It also included a va-
riety of additional substantive and procedural changes to the civil
justice system.3 5
The recommendations of the conference committee were
adopted by both houses; the bill passed the House by a vote of 70-46
and the Senate by a vote of 24-16. The bill was promptly vetoed by
Governor Chiles, who said:
I made it clear to the 1998 Florida Legislature that I could not ac-
cept a civil reform bill that gave untoward economic windfalls to
big business, that did not provide adequate compensation to inno-
cent victims, and that failed to protect Florida consumers. I urged
the Legislature to enact a balanced bill that corrected the problems
in our civil justice system, while ensuring that there remain ade-
quate remedies to victims of unlawful harm.
Unfortunately, a deeply divided Legislature sent me a highly
controversial and extreme bill that would leave Floridians exposed
to potentially harmful products and actions without adequately
compensating victims for injuries those products and actions will
cause. This bill would make some helpful changes to our civil jus-
tice system, but because this bill will do much more harm than
good to Floridians, I am compelled to veto Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 874.
... This bill does not promote a strong economy, but exposes
our citizens to risk and injury, and imposes upon our taxpayers
unwarranted and unjustified expenses. That is not fair to Floridi-
ans. The people of Florida, and visitors to our state, deserve to be
protected and compensated in the unfortunate event that they are
injured or victimized. This bill would not only erode those protec-
tions significantly, but it would shift the costs of the system from
wrongdoers to Florida taxpayers. As Governor, I am duty bound to
33. See Fla. CS for SB 874 (1998).
34. See Fla. CS for SB 874 (1998).
35. See Appendix for a detailed listing of all of the provisions of Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 874 (1998).
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protect our citizens, and I must ensure that those who commit
wrongful acts remain primarily responsible for paying for those
wrongful acts. I cannot allow this bill to become the law of this
state.
36
Following the November 1998 general elections, the business
community knew it would soon be working with a Republican gover-
nor 7 who, during the campaign, had declared that he would have
signed Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 874 had he been gover-
nor in 1998.38 The newly-elected legislature moved quickly to rekin-
dle the tort reform flames. Senate sponsors split up the tort reform
issues among four bills for the 1999 Session. Senate Bill 236 (Jack
Latvala, Palm Harbor, Repub.) addressed rental motor vehicle vi-
carious liability and the statute of repose for products liability cases,
Senate Bill 374 (John F. Laurent, Bartow, Repub.) addressed proce-
dural issues and included revisions to joint and several liability, and
Senate Bill 376 (Tom Lee, Brandon, Repub.) addressed negligent hir-
ing, premises liability, and punitive damages. 9 Workshops and hear-
ings on the bills were conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee
during February and March 1999, and the bills were brought to the
floor for a vote during what was only the second week of the 1999
Session.40
The House rolled everything into one committee bill, House Bill
775, introduced by the House Judiciary Committee. House Bill 775
went to the floor and was approved in the House by a vote of 86-33 on
the same day that the Senate took up its bills.4' Upon receipt of
House Bill 775, the Senate substituted the language of the four Sen-
ate bills for the House language and immediately sent it back to the
House on March 10, 1999. With a stalemate occurring between the
two houses, each refusing to accede to the other, the compromise bill
emerged from negotiations in conference committee over the next
36. Veto of Fla. CS for SB 874 (1998) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec'y of State Sandra
Mortham, May 18, 1998) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.) [here-
inafter Chiles].
37. Republican Jeb Bush was elected to replace the retiring Democratic Governor,
Lawton Chiles. Although the newly elected legislators take office upon election in Novem-
ber, the governor is not inaugurated until the following January. See FLA. CONST. art. III,
§ 15(d); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a).
38. See Peter Wallsten, Lawsuit Limits a Campaign Issue, ST. PETE. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1998, at 4B.
39. Taken together, the four bills addressed most of the provisions in Committee Sub-
stitute for Senate Bill 874; however, not all of these provisions were identical to those in
the enrolled version of Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 874. The bills collectively bore
more similarity to the original Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 874, as adopted by the
Senate Rules Committee.
40. The bills were taken up on second reading on March 9, 1999 and on third reading
on March 10; each bill passed by a vote of 39-0.
41. It was taken up and amended on March 9, 1999 and passed, as amended, on
March 10 (introduced and placed on calendar March 2, 1999).
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three weeks. The new bill differed from both the House and Senate
proposals (as well as from the prior year's Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 874) in a number of ways, but retained the major themes
of the earlier proposals.4 1 On April 30, 1999, after substantial debate,
the House adopted the Conference Committee Report and passed the
bill, as amended, by a vote of 84-33. The Senate followed suit shortly
thereafter by a vote of 25-14. Governor Bush signed the bill into law
on May 26, 1999. 43
III. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN HOUSE BILL 775
The enacted law contains the following four core issues that have
been key elements of the tort reform movement and are calculated to
have the most substantial impact on tort practice: joint and several
liability, punitive damages, products liability statute of repose, and
motor vehicle vicarious liability.
A. Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability refers to the doctrine under which tort-
feasors who are jointly at fault in causing the harm are each poten-
tially held individually liable for total damages caused by all of the
joint tortfeasors.44 Dean John W. Wade has explained that the notion
of assigning a percentage share of fault to each of several defendants
but holding each 100% liable to the plaintiff was developed for the
benefit of defendants.45 Previously, a plaintiff could sue any tortfea-
sor who was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury and recover
fully. It fell to the defendant to bring separate actions against other
responsible actors for contribution. Permitting the joinder of multiple
wrongdoers and assigning percentages of fault eliminated the burden
on defendants of pursuing a multiplicity of actions with potentially
inconsistent results. The percentage share did not represent the
amount of harm defendant caused, but rather the amount he could
be required by other joint tortfeasors to contribute. 46
For example, if a plaintiff visited three doctors, each of whom neg-
ligently failed to diagnose the plaintiffs cancer, each could be 100%
liable to the plaintiff. To insist that each doctor caused only one-third
of the plaintiffs injury, or that the same negligence caused only one-
fourth of the harm when yet another doctor was responsible for mis-
42. See Appendix for a complete listing of provisions compared to the 1998 and 1997
legislation.
43. See Fla. HB 775 (1999) (Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, 1999 Fla. Laws
1400).
44. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999).
45. See John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors Be
Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193, 194-97 (1986).
46. See id.
[Vol. 27:397
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diagnosis is irrational. It is even more irrational to insist that it is
more equitable for the innocent plaintiff, rather than the negligent
defendant, to bear the risk of nonrecovery from one or more joint
tortfeasors. 7
The misconception of the doctrine of joint and several liability
among legislators interfering with the centuries-old common-law
concept has generally and directly been attributed by scholars to an
"intensive, lavishly financed campaign"'" for "special-interest legisla-
tion ... primarily for the benefit of insurance companies. '49 "Reform"
of joint and several liability--of the kind enacted in House Bill 775-
is merely the result of "raw interest group politics" with little regard
to fairness."
The doctrine of joint and several liability has been a part of the
common law since early times and was explicitly adopted in Florida
by the Florida Supreme Court in 1914.51 When the Florida Supreme
Court discarded the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence in fa-
vor of comparative negligence in 1973, the court retained the doctrine
of joint and several liability.5 Shortly thereafter, the Florida Su-
preme Court and the legislature, nearly simultaneously, created a
right of contribution-the right of one joint tortfeasor who has paid
more than his share of a judgment to seek reimbursement from the
other joint tortfeasors. "
The application of the doctrine of joint and several liability was
substantially limited by the legislature in 1986 as part of the Tort
Reform and Insurance Act of 1986.14 The changes included: 1) aboli-
tion of joint and several liability for noneconomic damages; 2) aboli-
tion of joint and several liability for economic damages except with
respect to a defendant whose fault for the injury equals or exceeds
that of the plaintiff; and 3) retention of joint and several liability in
cases where the total damages are $25,000 or less, notwithstanding
the foregoing. This scheme was further altered by a 1993 Florida Su-
preme Court decision, which decreed that juries are required to re-
47. See id. at 197.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id. at 209.
50. Richard W. Wright, Ailocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1148 (1988) (arguing joint and several liability is consistent with
notions of corrective justice).
51. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Allen, 65 So. 8 (Fla. 1914).
52. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975) (taking effect while the Florida Supreme Court
was preparing its decision in Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975)).
54. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-160, § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1987)).
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duce a defendant's liability by apportioning fault to persons who are
not parties to the suit- including parties immune from suit.55
Chapter 99-225, Florida Laws, further limits joint and several li-
ability by imposing a series of caps on damages and fault thresh-
olds.5 6 The new law provides a scheme so Byzantine that it can only
be explained as a creature of political compromise. Under the new
law, application of the doctrine of joint and several liability to a par-
ticular defendant whose fault equals or exceeds that of a particular
plaintiff is determined as follows:
* A defendant whose fault is 0-10% is not subject to joint and sev-
eral liability; except, if the plaintiff is without fault, a defendant
whose fault is less than 10% is not subject to joint and several li-
ability;
" For a defendant whose fault is more than 10% but less than 25%,
joint and several liability does not apply to that portion of eco-
nomic damages in excess of $200,000; except, if the plaintiff is
without fault, then for a defendant whose fault is at least 10% but
less than 25%, joint and several liability does not apply to that
portion of economic damages in excess of $500,000;
" For a defendant whose fault is at least 25% but not more than
50%, joint and several liability does not apply to that portion of
economic damages in excess of $500,000; except, if the plaintiff is
without fault, then joint and several liability does not apply to
that portion of economic damages in excess of $1,000,000; and,
* For a defendant whose fault is greater than 50%, joint and sev-
eral liability does not apply to that portion of economic damages
in excess of $1,000,000; except, if the plaintiff is without fault,
then joint and several liability does not apply to that portion of
economic damages in excess of $2,000,000. 7
In addition, chapter 99-225, Florida Laws, also eliminates the
across-the-board application of the doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity to cases where the total damages are $25,000 or less and ad-
dresses the issue of how the alleged fault of a nonparty (per Fabre v.
Marn)58 is to be handled. A defendant's joint and several liability is
specified as being in addition to the defendant's proportional liability
for economic and noneconomic damages.
55. See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 1993).
56. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, § 27, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1419 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1999)).
57. See Ch. 99-225, § 27, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1419. As under current law, a defendant
is liable for its proportional share of both economic and noneconomic damages and is not
subject to the doctrine of joint and several liability if its percentage of fault is less than the
plaintiffs. See id.
58. See Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185 (discussing issue of nonparty fault).
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The 1999 Act further substantially limits a plaintiffs ability to re-
cover economic losses such as medical expenses. This adverse impact
is directly related to the seriousness of the injury, and it obviously
and most harshly affects the most catastrophically injured claimants
-those with large medical expenses. As was pointed out by Governor
Chiles in his veto message for the predecessor bill, an injured per-
son's necessary medical expenses rendered uncollectible from the
wrongdoer by this provision will not somehow magically disappear
but will instead become a burden that is shifted to the innocent-the
injured victim, the health care system, and the taxpayers. 59 More-
over, what may appear to some to be generously high caps on the
damages subject to joint and several liability are illusory because
they are tied to high fault thresholds. The $1,000,000 cap ($2,000,000
if plaintiff is faultless) only applies to a defendant who is more than
50% at fault, even if the defendant's share of damages would be
$5,000,000 if they were 40% at fault.
Furthermore, there can never be more than one defendant in a case
who will be jointly and severally liable for more than $1,000,000 (or
$2,000,000 if plaintiff is faultless), and frequently, there will never be
any defendant who can be held liable for that amount.
The complex formula contained in the law delivers inequitable, if
not bizarre, results. For example, a 1% difference in a plaintiffs com-
parative fault results in a 100% difference in economic damages sub-
ject to joint and several liability (a faultless plaintiff can receive up to
$2,000,000 in damages subject to joint and several liability whereas a
plaintiff who is 1% at fault is limited to a $1,000,000 cap on damages
subject to joint and several liability). And, if a plaintiff is faultless, a
defendant who is 10% at fault will be subject to joint and several li-
ability, but if the plaintiff is 1% at-fault, a defendant who is 10% at
fault will not be subject to joint and several liability. Other aspects of
the formula are mathematically imprecise and thereby leave the door
open to different results from similar circumstances depending on
how the calculations are performed.
B. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are traditionally awarded in response to behav-
ior worthy of especial condemnation. They are imposed to punish the
defendant for extreme wrongdoing and to deter others from engaging
59. In his letter to Secretary of State Sandra Mortham, Governor Chiles stated: "This
[provision] has the potential to deny full compensation to those who need it most: those vic-
tims who suffer catastrophic injuries, some of whom may require a lifetime of medical care,
or the families of victims who are killed by a wrongful act. If these costs are not borne by
the wrongdoers, they inevitably will be unfairly borne by all Floridians." Chiles, supra note
36.
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in similar conduct.60 The character of negligence necessary to sustain
a recovery of punitive damages is the same as for conviction for man-
slaughter.61 Prior to the passage of chapter 99-225, Florida Laws,
punitive damages could be awarded only if the conduct causing the
injury to the claimant:
(1) ... was so gross and flagrant as to show a reckless disregard
for human life or of the safety of persons exposed to the effects of
such conduct; or
(2) the conduct showed such an entire lack of care that the defen-
dant must have been consciously indifferent to the consequences;
or
(3) the conduct showed such an entire lack of care that the defen-
dant must have wantonly or recklessly disregarded the safety and
welfare of the public; or
(4) the conduct showed such reckless indifference to the rights of
others as to be equivalent to an intentional violation of those
rights.
6 2
Punitive damages "have long been a part of traditional state tort
law."63 In fact, punitive damages were well-established as a part of
the common law well before the American Revolution.6 4 The U.S. Su-
preme Court recently reiterated:
"It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in ac-
tions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may in-
flict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages
upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence
rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff. We are
aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by
some writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a
century are to be received as the best exposition of what the law is,
the question will not admit of argument...
60. See Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1981) (hold-
ing that before an employer can be held liable for punitive damages under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, there must be a showing of fault on the employer's part).
61. See Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 20 (Fla. 1959).
62. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § PD 1 (1997); see also Carraway, 116
So. 2d at 20 n.12.
63. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984).
64. See Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763) (validating exemplary
damages as compensation, punishment, and deterrence). See also, 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 137-38 (reprinted 1992) (1765-1769).
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"This has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the de-
gree of punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on the pecu-
liar circumstances of each case. '65
Florida law has been consistent with these teachings. The degree
of punishment to be imposed has been a matter for the jury to decide,
and punitive damages were to be held excessive only when they bore
no relation to the amount a defendant was able to pay and when the
tort lacked the required degree of malice or disregard for rights.66
The 1986 Act imposed several statutory restrictions on punitive
damages. It imposed on plaintiffs a prerequisite that the plaintiff
first make an evidentiary showing of a reasonable basis for recovery
before punitive damages could even be claimed.6 1 It presumptively
capped punitive damages at three times the amount of compensatory
damages in any civil action based on negligence, strict liability,
products liability, misconduct in commercial transactions, profes-
sional liability, or breach of warranty and involving willful, wanton,
or gross misconduct; this was subject to a plaintiff being able to ex-
ceed the cap by a clear and convincing showing that the greater
amount is not excessive.68 Also, the state was given 60% of the
amount of all punitive damage awards, which was amended in 1992
to 35%.19
The 1999 legislation makes it more difficult for a plaintiff by re-
quiring that the plaintiff prove entitlement to an award of punitive
damages by clear and convincing evidence. It also limits the type of
wrongful behavior for which punitive damages can be awarded. The
current standard was changed to "intentional misconduct" or "gross
negligence," which is defined in the bill to require "conscious disre-
gard or indifference," in other words, essentially intentionally wrong-
ful conduct. 70 As was the case with joint and several liability, the
compromise that became the 1999 Act similarly applies a complex
formula to cap punitive damages according to criteria linked with the
65. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 16 (1991) (emphasis added)
(quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852)); see also Missouri Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) (stating that "[t]he discretion of the jury in
[punitive damages] cases is not controlled by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of al-
lowing such additional damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the prac-
tice").
66. See Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978); Lassitter v. Inter-
national Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626-27 (Fla. 1976).
67. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-160, § 51, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 748-49 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1987)).
68. See id. § 52, 1986 Fla. Laws at 749 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a), (b)
(1987)).
69. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2)(b) (1987)). The state share was repealed
by operation of a sunset provision. See Act effective July 1, 1995, ch. 92-85, § 3, 1992 Fla.
Laws 821, 822 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2)).
70. Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, § 22, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1416 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1999)).
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nature of the wrongful conduct. Generally, punitive damages are lim-
ited to the greater of $500,000 or three times compensatory damages.
If the defendant's wrongful conduct was motivated solely by "unrea-
sonable financial gain" and the defendant had actual knowledge of
the dangerous nature of the conduct, then punitive damages are lim-
ited to the greater of $2,000,000 or four times compensatory dam-
ages. Where at the time of injuzy, however, the defendant had spe-
cific intent to harm the claimant, there is no limit on punitive dam-
ages.
The 1999 Act goes on to limit multiple awards of punitive dam-
ages against an entity. The Act provides that there can be no puni-
tive-damage award based on the same act or single course of conduct
for which punitive damages have already been imposed by any
court-a Florida court, any other state's court, or any federal court-
unless the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that
the total of any and all prior awards was insufficient to punish the
defendant.7 ' In such cases, then, the court may allow the jury to
award punitive damages. 2 The court is allowed to "consider" whether
or not the defendant has ceased the egregious conduct. If a jury ver-
dict is allowed, the court is required to reduce it by an amount equal
to the total amount of all earlier punitive damage awards made
against the defendant for that act or course of conduct; however, the
jury is not to be informed that this reduction will be made. 3
The law also immunizes employers from liability for punitive
damages based on an employee's actions unless the employer actively
participated in or approved the conduct, or engaged in grossly negli-
gent conduct that contributed to the loss. 74 The 1999 Act provides an
exception to the new caps and pleading requirements for cases in-
volving child abuse, abuse of the elderly or developmentally disad-
vantaged, cases arising under chapter 400 (relating to nursing
homes, ACLFs, etc.), and cases where the defendant was intoxi-
cated. 5
The 1999 Act arguably drives punitive damages to the brink of ex-
tinction in Florida. The new law effectively outlaws punitive dam-
ages for anything but consciously intentional misconduct and only if
that misconduct has not been previously punished and cannot be
pawned off as the ultra vires act of an employee.76 For the resolute
plaintiff who manages to surmount all these hurdles, the 1999 Act
71. See id. § 23, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1416-17 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (1999)).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. § 22, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1416 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1999)).
75. See id. §§ 24, 25, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1418-19 (codified respectively at FLA. STAT. §§
768.735-.736 (1999)).
76. See id. §§ 22, 23 1999 Fla. Laws at 1416-17 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 768.72-.73
(1999)).
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provides deceptively generous limits. Although these caps may look
generous at first blush, careful reading of the standards for both the
second and the third tier reveal that, in practice, these levels may
well turn out to be virtually unattainable because of the near impos-
sibility of proving the requisite actual knowledge and intent to cause
harm.77 Punitive damages are even capped for "intentional miscon-
duct" as defined in the statute!71 Under the 1999 Act, there is, how-
ever, one theoretical level of wrongful conduct with regard to which
no cap applies-it must involve a specific intent to harm the claimant
at the time ofinjury.7 The problem is that the conduct must be even
worse than intentional misconduct and the burden of proof is more
onerous."' It follows that since the requisite intent to harm the
claimant must coexist in time with the claimant's injury, it would
seem that there can never be a non-capped punitive damages award
when the manifestation of the injury occurs at some time after the
wrongful act-as is the situation in every products liability case
where the wrongful act takes place at manufacture.
C. Vicarious Liability of Motor Vehicle Owners
Vicarious liability refers to the doctrine whereby liability or re-
sponsibility for one person's acts is imputed to another person, such
as the employer of the person engaged in the wrongful act.81 Tradi-
tionally, vicarious liability has applied in the area of inherently dan-
gerous devices. Florida courts have used this doctrine to hold the
owner of a motor vehicle vicariously liable for injury caused by the
negligence of another person whom the owner allows to use the vehi-
cle.82 The rule applies equally to rental cars.8 3 However, vicarious li-
ability does not apply when the vehicle has been stolen or when the
operator of the vehicle secures the vehicle by fraud and keeps the ve-
hicle without authorization8 4 or to the situation where injuries are
caused by an employee of a repair facility with whom the car was
left.85
77. Consider that to reach the second tier, for example, the plaintiff must prove that
"unreasonable financial gain" (whatever that means) was a defendant's sole motivation.
Even if that is possible, it passes only the first prong of the test in proving actual knowl-
edge of the dangerous nature of the conduct. See id. § 23, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1417 (codified
as FLA. STAT. § 768.73((l)(b)).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (7th ed. 1999).
82. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 631 (Fla. 1920).
83. See Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 836-37 (Fla. 1959).
84. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051, 1053-54 (Fla. 1993) ("conversion" or
"theft exception").
85. See Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 1978) ("shop exception").
2000]
414 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:397
The 1999 Act amends section 324.021, Florida Statutes, to cap the
vicarious liability of motor vehicle owners.86 The owner's liability is
limited to $100,000 per person/$300,000 per incident, plus $500,000
additional for economic damages if the vehicle lessee or operator has
combined insurance coverage of less than $500,000.17 These caps ap-
ply to rental vehicles and to all privately owned vehicles operated by
another with the owner's permission.8 The bill contains an excep-
tion, however, that allows the assertion of liability for certain vehi-
cles used in the owner's commercial activities, such as a fleet of de-
livery trucks, and for certain commercial vehicles used to carry haz-
ardous products under certain conditions.8 9 The 1999 Act provides a
set-off against the owner's liability for all other available insurance
or self-insurance covering the lessee or operator so that the owner's
liability is directly reduced by the amount of such available insur-
ance. Once again, the 1999 Act provides businesses with a windfall at
the expense of the injured.
D. Product Liability Statute of Repose
A statute of repose creates a period of time within which an action
must be commenced. In the products liability context where an action
is based on manufacturing or design defect, a statute of repose cuts
off a manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by a defective prod-
uct when that product reaches an age equivalent to the repose pe-
riod. If a person is injured by a defective product after its repose pe-
riod has run, that person has no recourse against the manufacturer
of the defective product.
At one time Florida had a twelve-year statute of repose for prod-
uct liability actions.90 Enacted in 1974, that law was declared uncon-
stitutional, because, as applied, it violated the right of access to
courts under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.9 1 The
Florida Supreme Court later receded from this decision,92 but the leg-
islature shortly thereafter amended the law,93 leaving no statute of
repose in its place for products liability actions.
86. See Act effective Oct. 1. 1999, ch. 99-225, § 28, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1421 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. §324.021(9) (1999)).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1421-22.
89. See id. at 1422.
90. See FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (1974).
91. See Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980), overruled by
Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659-60 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S.
1114 (1986).
92. See Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659-60 (Fla. 1985), appeal dis-
missed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986).
93. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-272, § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws 2019-20 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1985)).
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There is, however, an eighteen-year federal statute of repose for
certain general aviation aircraft. 94 The federal statute only applies to
aircraft with a maximum seating capacity of twenty individuals. It
does not apply to any aircraft used in scheduled commercial service,
regardless of the aircraft's size.
The 1999 Act creates a twelve-year repose period but permits ex-
tension for defective products if the manufacturer has represented
that the product has an expected useful life of longer than ten years,
in which case the repose period runs to the end of the expected useful
life or twelve years, whichever is greater.95 This looks good on paper,
but one must wonder how many manufacturers will actually subject
themselves to this voluntary exception. With respect to commercial
aircraft, the law contains two conflicting provisions. In one place, the
1999 Act clearly states that there is no repose period for such air-
craft; but, in another place, it indicates--albeit in a somewhat
oblique fashion-that there is a twenty-year repose period (unless
the manufacturer warrants a longer expected useful life) on such air-
craft.96 The Act also contains exceptions for escalators, elevators, im-
provements to real property, and a twenty-year repose period for ves-
sels.9"
The 1999 Act also provides a short-sighted exception for latent
disease-causing products by waiving the repose period if the injury
does not manifest itself within twelve years." Still, it only applies if
exposure to the product occurs within twelve years of sale.99 This
proviso effectively provides substantial immunity to manufacturers
of products like asbestos or DES and leaves their victims to suffer
without recourse.
The new law purports to provide for tolling of the repose period
during the concealment of defects by a manufacturer."m This tolling
provision, however, only applies if the injured person is able to prove
that the officers, directors, or managing agents of the manufacturer
had actual knowledge of the defect and took affirmative steps to con-
ceal the defect.10 ' As with so many of the Act's provisions, what at
first looks like a refuge for the victim is rendered illusory in actual
practice by an impossible burden for a plaintiff to overcome. Unlike
94. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552.
95. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1410 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. §§ 95.031(2)(b)1, 3 (1999)).
96. See id.
97. See id. Improvements to real property are already subject to a fifteen-year statute
of repose pursuant to section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c)
(1997).
98. See Ch. 99-225, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1411 (amending FLA. STAT. §9
95.031(2)(b)1, 3).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
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most of the Act, the new statute of repose takes effect July 1, 1999
(as opposed to October 1), and it applies retroactively to products al-
ready on the market.'0 ' However, any action that would otherwise be
barred by the new changes and that arose before the effective date
can be brought before July 1, 2003.103 Once again, the legislature has
granted to businesses a financial windfall at the expense of Florida
consumers.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AT STAKE
While there are considerable economic and conceptual flaws that
plague the 1999 Act, it is also critical to understand that the right of
the people to seek redress for their injuries in court is a constitu-
tional right of the first order. As was declared by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the most seminal decision in all of constitutional law: "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every in-
dividual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protec-
tion."'0 4 This essential duty was made explicit in the constitutions of
the vast majority of states. 0 5 Other states have interpreted their
constitutions to embrace such a right.0 6 Florida's constitution simi-
larly and explicitly guarantees courts available "to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice.., administered without sale, de-
nial or delay."''0 7
As such, meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right-
a right that the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized. 08 The im-
portance of this right cannot be overemphasized. No law can pass
constitutional muster if it bars the people "from resorting to the
courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right to petition the courts
cannot be so handicapped."' 0' 9 The vindication of rights that courts
comprehend within this constitutional protection includes full and
fair compensation for the full range of civil wrongs. In 1992, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "one of the hallmarks
of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of dam-
ages to compensate the plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by the vio-
102. See id. § 12, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1411.
103. See id.
104. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
105. Thirty-eight states have constitutional provisions that guarantee a right to a "cer-
tain remedy." JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2(a), at 347 n.ll (1996).
106. See, e.g., Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 763 P.2d 1153, 1161
(N.M. 1988) (recognizing that a limit on liability violates an implicit guarantee to the fun-
damental right of access to the courts that is derived from the right of redress for griev-
ances and the right to due process).
107. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
108. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
109. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7
(1964).
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lation of his legal rights."'110 These injuries may well include emo-
tional distress and pain and suffering.'
The guarantee of access to the courts would be hollow indeed if it
was capable of being eroded by the kinds of indirect restraints con-
tained in the 1999 Act. Traditionally, however, the due process
clauses of the nation's state constitutions stand as a bulwark against
such erosion by guaranteeing, at the most primary of levels, an op-
portunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.""' As the Florida Supreme Court has recognized, legislation
affecting the judicial process must assure "a fair trial in a fair tribu-
nal."'1 1 The court went on to note that "[n]ot only is a biased deci-
sionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but 'our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.""' 4
So-called "reforms" that effectively tilt the civil justice playing field
in a manner that encumbers the quest for fairness violate these fun-
damental constitutional tenets.
These rights cannot easily be swept away by countervailing gov-
ernmental interests, especially ones as flimsy as those asserted by
tort-reform advocates. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
even a legitimate concern that the enacted reforms are designed to
address---"the dangers of baseless litigation"-are insufficient to jus-
tify legislative remedies that would seriously cripple the vindication
of rights through the judicial process. 1 5 The Florida Supreme Court
has adopted a similarly strong stance against legislative interference
with access to the courts. In Kuger v. White,"1 the court held that
the legislature was without power to abolish a common-law cause of
action unless it provided an adequate alternative or was able to as-
sert both overwhelming public necessity and a lack of alternatives.
In determining whether the legislature has met its burden, the
court has conceded that deference should be given to legislative find-
ings. 117 In this instance, there are no legislative findings to consider.
At the eleventh hour of this lengthy legislative process, there was a
curious attempt to interject legislative findings into the final product
to explain why the legislature was taking away the rights of its citi-
110. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 257 (1978)).
111. See id.
112. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
113. Koehler v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 390 So. 2d 711, 712 (1980) (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1965) (finding that such fairness was "a basic requirement
of due process")).
114. Id. (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
115. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,
223 (1967) (citations omitted).
116. 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
117. See, e.g., University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 196 (Fla. 1993).
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zenry. Near the end of the Conference Committee process, at a
March 28 meeting of the Senate conferees, Senator Latvala, Chair of
the Senate conferees, presented the members with the latest Senate
proposal for their consideration. Among the other provisions in Sena-
tor Latvala's proposal, and one that appeared here for the first time
during the three years of deliberation on the tort reform bills, was a
collection of legislative findings that were obviously calculated to
shore up the legislation against growing concerns over its unconsti-
tutionality.118
As Senator Latvala, a nonlawyer, had served neither on the 1999
Senate Judiciary Committee nor on the 1998 Senate Select Commit-
tee on Litigation Reform, one must wonder at his remarkable ability
to distill so concisely two years worth of largely technical legal testi-
mony, which he was not present to hear. Senator John A. Grant
(Tampa, Repub.), a member of the Conference Committee and Chair
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, immediately challenged the in-
clusion of these findings pointing out that, based on what went on
during committee deliberations, there was no factual basis for these
118. Section 1 of Draft Senate Amendment No. 0O00.1a provided:
Section 1. Legislative findings.-The Legislature finds that the provisions of
this Act serve overpowering public necessities, including:(1) Enhancing the predictability and uniformity of the civil justice system so
that citizens and businesses can conform their conduct to avoid liability;(2) Preserving societal cohesion by encouraging citizens to resolve their dis-
putes amicably, rather than by filing civil actions or engaging in litigious be-
havior;
(3) Stimulating economic development and productivity by limiting economic
waste and reducing the cost of obtaining liability insurance;
(4) Strengthening the state's competitive posture;
(5) Enhancing the state's ability to attract manufacturing businesses which
provide stable and high-paying jobs, which in turn will help to create a tax base
sufficient to fund the vital responsibilities of state government;
(6) Aiding consumers by encouraging innovation and the development of new
products and by reducing the cost of products currently on the market;
(7) Protecting citizens and businesses from the threat of frivolous and pro-
tracted litigation which consumes resources, costs jobs and coerces undeserved
settlements; and
(8) Encouraging personal responsibility by moving away from a social-welfare
model of allocating damages and toward a model which equates liability with
fault;
(9) In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court pronouncement in Hoffman
v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973), the Legislature finds that "in the field
of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be reached by a court is the
equation of liability with fault"; and
(10) In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court pronouncement in Fabre v.
Marin, 623 So.2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 1993), the Legislature finds that "there is
nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100% of
the loss, and there is no social policy that should compel defendants to pay
more than their fair share of the loss.
Section 1 of Draft Senate Amendment No. 0000. la, dated 1:50 PM Apr. 28, 1999.
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findings. Although no vote was taken on Senator Grant's point, the
"findings" disappeared from subsequent drafts, never to return."9
The next day, when Representative Johnnie B. Byrd, Jr. (Plant
City, Repub.) Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, presented the
Conference Committee Report on the House floor, his remarks in-
cluded his view on the bill's legislative intent. The script was essen-
tially the same as the one Senator Latvala used, and the remarks
made it clear that the major justification for passing the legislation
was to promote economic development:
Finally members, I would say that the legislative intent of the con-
ference report and the bill would be to enhance the predictability
and uniformity of the civil justice system. The conference report
would enhance substantial fairness in our system. Today people
have to pay even when they are innocent of wrongdoing. The con-
ference report would encourage an amicable resolution of disputes
through alternate dispute resolution such as mediation and arbi-
tration. The conference report would help stimulate economic de-
velopment and productivity ... It will encourage innovation in
new products and it will enhance the ability to attract a better
manufacturing base. It will discourage frivolous litigation, and fi-
nally, encourage personal responsibility by moving away from so-
cial engineering and welfare in the tort system by equating liabil-
ity with fault. That is an explanation, Mr. Speaker, of the confer-
ence report.1
20
As icing on the legislative intent cake, Chairman Byrd's state-
ments as to the "goals that the legislation was necessary to accom-
plish" were reiterated in a somewhat more straightforward form in
the final House Judiciary Committee staff analysis of House Bill
775. 121 These justifications track the language of the Latvala proposal
challenged the prior day even more closely. Moreover, the staff
analysis goes on to point out that "the conclusions stated by Chair-
man Byrd in 1999 were informed by his membership on the [House
Civil Justice and Claims Committee during the hearings of 1997-
98] .1l2 Thus, it seems that, by the admission of its own chair, nothing
presented to the House Judiciary Committee during its 1999 delib-
erations furthered the stated legislative goals of the 1999 Act.
119. Fla. S. Conf. Comm. on HB 775, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 28, 1999) (on
file with Secretary) (discussion between Sen. Latvala and Sen. Grant regarding legislative
findings).
120. Fla. H.R., transcript of House floor debate on Conference Committee Report on
HB 775 at 4 (Apr. 30, 1999) (on file with authors) (statement of Representative Byrd) (em-
phasis added).
121. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary Analysis, HB 775 (1999) Staff Analysis 21 (final
May 15, 1999) (copy on file with authors).
122. Id.
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It is difficult to comprehend how Representative Byrd could claim
to speak for the collective intent of the legislature regarding the final
product when no legislative findings of fact were ever actually ap-
proved by a vote of any legislative body at any time during the period
from 1997 to 1999. Further, Representative Byrd was the only mem-
ber of the House of Representatives who served on the House Civil
Justice & Claims Committee and the Conference Committee on
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 874 in 1998, as well as the
House Judiciary Committee and the Conference Committee on House
Bill 775 in 1999.123 Representative Byrd, by his own admission, indi-
cated that the facts on which he based his conclusions were not even
considered by the same legislature that enacted House Bill 775 into
law. 124
V. THE "TORT TAX"
Although legislative findings were stripped from the 1999 Act be-
fore passage, the attempt to justify tort reform as a necessary spur to
economic well-being became the mantra uttered as though it abro-
gated constitutional obligations. For this purpose, tort reform propo-
nents relied heavily, if not exclusively, on a paper that has become
known as the "Fishkind Report."'2' The report, prepared as an advo-
cacy piece for tort reform proponents acting under the umbrella of
Tort Reform United Effort,126 makes no effort to appear as a disinter-
ested scholar's report. Instead of examining the whole of the litera-
ture, it is a poorly informed survey of reforms enacted in other states
and what other pro-tort reform groups have claimed about the bene-
fits of tort reform.
The overall weakness of the report is demonstrated by, among
other things, the fact that fewer than three pages-largely consisting
of pie charts that reveal the subjective judgments of small business
representatives about how much they like being sued---out of a total
of twenty-five pages are devoted to Florida-specific data.1"7 Even so,
the Fishkind Report concedes that to quantify the impact of the tort
system on Florida "accurately" would amount to or present "a diffi-
cult, expensive, and time-consuming task.'"18 It is a task that the au-
thor does not attempt. Instead, because of "limitations of time and
money," he relies entirely on what he characterizes as "secondary
123. Coincidentally, there was similarly only one member of the Senate, Senator Burt,
who participated on all of the committees and conference committees.
124. The 1997-1998 hearings during which Rep. Byrd formed his conclusions were con-
ducted by the Legislature whose biennium ended in November 1998.
125. See Fishkind Report, supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying notes 25-
29.
126. Fishkind Report, supra note 24 at cover page.
127. See id. at 23-25.
128. Id. at 21.
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data."' 9 Such secondary data almost exclusively consistes of studies
done by other tort-reform advocacy groups in other states, notably
the Beacon Hill Institute, concerning Massachusetts. The only Flor-
ida-specific information was gleaned from the National Federation of
Independent Business survey of Florida's small businesses, a poll
that came to the unremarkable conclusion that most respondents
fear lawsuits. 30 This conclusion, however, miserably fails to justify
overriding constitutional rights. Notably, the survey did not find that
most respondents had been sued or subjected to untoward liability.
Fundamental to the Fishkind Report's analysis is the adoption of
the idea that "most [economic] studies treat tort costs as a tax,"'' be-
cause businesses "either insure themselves against a loss, or. . . 'self
insure' by raising their prices.'13 2 Why the decision to insure oneself
constitutes a tax is never explained and is inconsistent with the defi-
nition of a tax. A tax is defined as "a pecuniary burden laid upon in-
dividuals or property for the purpose of supporting the government";
a tax is distinguishable from a penalty, which is "in the nature of a
punishment and is collectible usually by fine or by suit."' Instead, it
is obvious that tort reformers have latched onto the "tax" terminology
because of its value in the public opinion war, regardless of its inac-
curacy. Criticizing the civil justice system as exacting a "tort tax"
was a tactic widely adopted and employed by tort reform advocates in
Florida during the debate over the 1999 Act.
The misguided idea that every American pays a "tort tax" to fund
a lawsuit industry that is economically counterproductive first
gained prominence in polemicist Peter Huber's book, Liability: The
Legal Revolution and Its Consequences.3 4 The "scholarship" Huber
posited has been thoroughly discredited by reputable scholars, who
have derided it as misleading, shaky, and riddled with errors. 35 De-
spite these criticisms, Huber's much-repeated assertion that the li-
ability system costs the economy $80 billion directly and $300 billion
indirectly 3 6 has had considerable staying power even though the fig-
ures are built on artifice. After Vice President Dan Quayle repeated
the numbers, Professor Galanter detailed their specious origins:
Those who beat the antilawyer drum tell us, to take a statement
made by the vice-president to a group of business leaders last Oc-
129. Id.
130. See id. at 23-25.
131. Id. at 21.
132. Id. at 22.
133. Liberis v. Nee, 10 F. Supp. 336, 337 (N.D. Fla. 1935).
134. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4
(1988).
135. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cheseboro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship,
42 AM. L. REV. 1637, 1655-58 (1993) (recounting some of the many critiques).
136. See HUBER, supra note 134, at 4.
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tober, that "the legal system.., now costs Americans an estimated
$300 billion a year." Three hundred billion? Where does that come
from? The vice-president has it from the Council on Competitive-
ness (which he chairs), whose "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform,"
released August 13, 1991, borrows it from an article in Forbes,
which in turn took it from liability guru Peter Huber, who, it is fair
to say, made it up.
From a single sentence spoken by corporate executive Robert
Malott in a 1986 roundtable discussion of product liability, Huber,
in his 1988 book Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Conse-
quences, adopted an unsubstantiated estimate that the direct costs
of the U.S. tort system are at least $80 billion a year-a number
far higher than the estimates in careful and systematic studies of
these costs. Huber then multiplied Malott's surmise by 3.5 and
rounded it up to $300 billion-and called that the indirect cost of
the tort system. The 3.5 multiplier came from a reference in a
medical journal editorial concerning the effects on doctors' prac-
tices of increases in their malpractice premiums. Huber's book con-
tained no discussion of the applicability of this multiplier. It would
appear that Huber, who has recently taken to lecturing on the
dangers of "junk science," certainly knows whereof he speaks.137
The $300 billion figure, the first and most repeated figure when
claims are made that tort liability constitutes a form of tax, has also
been ridiculed by scores of scholars and other prominent legal think-
ers. Judge Roger Miner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, a conservative Reagan appointee, said that the "$300 billion
figure has been 'demonstrated to be a product of casual speculation
and not derived in any sense from investigative or statistical analy-
sis."' 13 Similarly, The Economist has scored the figure as having "no
discernible connection to reality"3 9 and for being "impossible to jus-
tify." 40 Economist Peter L. Kahn said Huber's numbers are "totally
misleading" and "immensely overstate the cost of the tort system to
society."' 4' A law professor who examined the underlying sources for
Huber's claims found that they amount to a "huge exaggeration" and
137. Marc Galanter, Pick a Number, Any Number, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992, at 84.
138. Henry J. Reske, In Defense of Lawyers: Conservative Judge Challenges Quayle
Statistics, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 33 (quoting Judge Roger J. Miner).
139. Order in the Tort, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 8, 13.
140. Not Guilty, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 13, 1993, at 63 (explaining that increased tort litiga-
tion is not the cause of rising legal costs in the U.S.).
141. Peter L. Kahn, Pricing the US. Legal System, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 11,
1992, at 19 (addressing the inaccuracy of statistics that are often quoted by tort reform ad-
vocates).
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are "so misleading that they amount to little more than scare tac-
tics. 1 42
At the most elemental level, it is improper to view the costs asso-
ciated with securing all Americans access to the courts as a tax. One
leading scholar, now a federal appellate judge, has written that it is
nonsensical to consider anything other than losses in evaluating the
economic impact of accidents.1 43
Others agree. Professor Richard Abel has written that "successful
tort claims do not create liability costs, they merely shift [the costs]
from victims to tortfeasors [wrongdoers]. It is the tortfeasors who
create liability costs by injuring victims .... If liability costs are high,
it is because injuries are frequent and serious."'" Professor Mark
Rahdert echoes this point, warning against shifting liability, and its
associated costs, away from those who cause injuries:
Shifting liability away from the manufacturer inevitably shifts it
toward the victim. It makes the victim (and his or her cost-
spreading pool) the bearer of the risk and, to the extent of that
risk, the indirect insurer of the marketing initiative. Given that
some victims are likely to be uninsured and others underinsured,
what we have to ask is whether the social benefits of the market-
ing initiative in question justify imposing on a select group of vic-
tims the social and personal costs of uncompensated injury. In a
society where the value of compensation for injury is esteemed,
that is a choice we should never make lightly.145
Professor Rahdert further asserts:
It is probably not particularly helpful to describe tort law as
though it were tax law. There is a distinct rhetorical flavor to all
arguments about the tort system that use the language of tax-
ation ....
Perhaps the best way to get rid of the rhetoric is to eliminate the
tax metaphor and to view the issue, less metaphorically, in insur-
ance terms instead.'4
In fact, if one views the costs of liability not as a tax, but as an insur-
ance cost, the justification for tort reform falls flat on its face.
Despite the ridicule heaped on it by scholars, the idea of the "tort
tax" has remained a powerful rhetorical tool in the arsenal of the tort
142. Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Itr Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42
STAN. L. REV. 539, 547, 579 (1990) (pointing out fallacies in figures used as support for tort
reform efforts).
143. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS passim (1970).
144. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 446
(1987).
145. MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND TORT
REFORM 161 (1995).
146. Id. at 157-58.
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reformers. Instead of relying on Huber's discredited, and even out-
dated, $300 billion figure, tort reformers now trot out studies like the
Fishkind Report as though they are authoritative. Yet these studies
also suffer from poor methodology, exaggerated addition, a studied
indifference to the system's benefits, and most important, a funda-
mental misunderstanding of what constitues tort costs-namely, that
all manner of insurance costs can be attributed to the tort system. By
adopting the "tort tax" theory of other studies, the Fishkind Report
compounded the flaws and errors that such studies contain.
A. Beacon Hill Institute Study
One of the "tort tax" "studies" most heavily relied upon by the
Fishkind Report was produced by the Beacon Hill Institute.47 Beacon
Hill applied the national tort-cost figures to Massachusetts and con-
cluded that the "tort system imposes an implicit tax-a 'tort tax'-
that penalizes business for creating jobs and capital, with predict-
able, negative effects on the economy." Based upon this conculsion,
Beacon Hill urged support of a civil justice reform measure that
would "place new limits on the rights of tort plaintiffs under Massa-
chusetts law."4 8
The Beacon Hill study starts with a figure of $161 billion nation-
ally.4 9 Using inaccurate and flawed methodology, Beacon Hill adds
147. See BEACON HILL INSTITUTE, ECONOMICS OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
MASSACHUSETTS (1998).
148. Id. at v.
149. See id. at i (citing TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, TORT COSTS TRENDS: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1995)) [hereinafter TTP REPORT]. The authors of the Till-
inghast-Towers Perrin report, an insurance industry consulting firm, arrived at the figure
by adding insurance benefits paid for injuries or damages caused by insureds, their costs
for handling insurance claims or providing legal representation to insureds, and insurance
company overhead. See id. at 5. TTP admits that much of the figure is derived from mere
guesswork because there are no reliable figures for much of its calculation. See id. at 6.
The $161 billion figure is further inflated because it charges costs and expenses of the in-
surance industry to the tort system without accounting for the profits that insurance com-
panies make off the premiums or the dividends paid to mutual policyholders (which under
the Byzantine accounting methods used by the insurance industry are counted as "losses"
rather than profit). Further, the wealth insurance companies generate by investing liabil-
ity premiums--the bulk of the insurance industry's profits--is also not subtracted from the
supposed societal costs. See generally ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS (1982).
Indeed, if one makes the claim that liability premiums are a cost to society, then it natu-
rally follows that the investment return on these premiums must be considered a benefit
somehow. Insurance companies are certainly not reluctant to disclose their losses, espe-
cially if it advances the tort reform cause, but these losses do not mean the insurance com-
panies are not profitable.
This omission is readily acknowledged by TTP in its study:
The tort system also provides indirect benefits that are not measured in this
study. Such benefits include a systematic resolution of disputes, thereby reduc-
ing conflict, possibly including violence. In this sense, compensation for pain
and suffering is seen as not only fair, but beneficial to society as a whole. An-
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an unarticulated and unknown percentage of other forms of insur-
ance, including homeowners, farm owners, multi-peril, and product
liability insurance (the last of which they incredibly and impossibly
claim costs $652 billion in Massachusetts-most likely a typographi-
cal error) to create their "tort tax." Yet, the costs the Institute totals
are not those of the tort system, but that of the insurance industry as
a whole. Still, Beacon Hill claims its estimate is a conservative one
because it does not calculate court costs, litigation costs, unnecessary
medical procedures, or the disappearance of products or whole indus-
tries.150
The Beacon Hill Report is the source for the Fishkind Report's
figure of a Florida tort tax of $655 per person. Dr. Frederick Raffa of
the University of Central Florida recalculated the Beacon Hill data,
deleting the costs of multi-peril insurance that is unrelated to the
tort system and arriving at net costs based on a comparison of per
capita insurance premiums with per capita claims/benefits. He and
arrived at a much lower per capita net insurance cost of $156.37 in
1991 and $203.25 in 1995.51 This analysis demonstrates that the
claimed tort tax was strategically inflated to serve a political pur-
pose.
Still, Beacon Hill's rehance-and by extension, the Fiskind Re-
port's reliance--on insurance costs as a means of estimating the costs
of the tort system is wholly inappropriate. Insurance, of course, is the
means by which society spreads risks. Individuals purchase insur-
ance on the chance that they may suffer a loss in the future, paying
only a fraction of that potential loss. Most of us will not recoup those
premiums paid, but some will suffer extraordinary losses that the
money put into the insurance pool will cover. In many instances, nei-
ther insurance nor insurance payouts will have anything to do with
the tort system. To achieve a sufficiently shocking figure about the
cost of the system, the Beacon Hill "tort tax" toters throw in every-
thing, including the kitchen sink. All paid insurance premiums are
tallied in the analysis, including homeowners, crop and farm insur-
ance, and other multi-perils. As a result, Beacon Hill charges the tort
other indirect benefit is that the tort system may act as a deterrent to unsafe
practices and products.
TTP REPORT, supra at 9.
Robert Sturgis, the lead author of the TTP report, has been quoted in reference to an ear-
lier report as saying, "we have settled upon a definition of gross cost without regard for the
social and economic benefits that may be derived from the system." Galanter, supra note 9,
at 1142 n.193 (quoting Robert W. Sturgis, Address to the American Insurance Association
(Nov. 14, 1985), cited in NATIoNAL UNDERWRITER, Nov. 11, 1985). The result is a wildly in-
flated figure for tort costs.
150. See BEACON HILL INSTITUTE, supra note 147, at 54.
151. See Frederick A. Raffa, Comments on the Economic Analysis, in Fishkind & As-
socs., Economic Impact Report 3 (1998) (unpublished report prepared for Tort Reform
United Effort 3 (unpublished report, copy on file with authors).
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system with responsibility for hurricane, fire, flood and other dam-
ages that are often regarded as acts of God and unlikely to be the ob-
jects of tort liability. 152
As Floridians know even better than most, the damage incurred
during natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods and tornadoes
can be devastating and may amount to billions of dollars. Proponents
of the "tort tax" notion, however, fail to explain why these costs
should be attributed to the legal system. The fact is, the only law-
suits likely to arise from such natural catastrophes-rare by any
measure--either would be against an insurance company for the bad-
faith denial of a claim under a person's disaster insurance policy or
by an insurance company to recover for its payout against a contrac-
tor whose work was guaranteed to stand up to such catastrophes.
Here, as is typically the case, the civil justice system exists to hold
people and companies accountable for their clear responsibilities.
Without such a system, our economy would be permeated with fraud
and populated by con artists who know that they will never need to
live up to their promises.
Moreover, treating liability insurance premium payments as a
tort cost in other areas of recovery is a flaw of considerable dimen-
sion. Premiums finance the insurance industry, and their treatment
as a tax turns that industry into little more than a parasite eating
away at the economy. Yet, rather than robbing the economy of
wealth, insurance premiums create significant investment profits
that help pay insurance benefits, fuel other economic development,
and generate real tax revenues. These profits and benefits do not ma-
terialize out of thin air, as the Beacon Hill study would have one be-
lieve, but are an offsetting economic advantage that the study fails to
take into account. Nor does the study consider any benefits that
might be derived from the tort system in the form of safer products,
deterrence against negligent activity, or a reduction in the expenses
that would otherwise have to be picked up by government and tax-
payers.
Misrepresentation of the costs perhaps attributable to the tort
system permeates the study. For example, Beacon Hill includes data
from commercial liability,1 53 which is usually a function of contract
rather than tort law. Yet, the proposed reforms supposedly "tested"
by the Beacon Hill study do not limit the right of businesses to sue,
but only limit-by Beacon Hill's own admission-tort plaintiffs.
One point the Beacon Hill study makes repeatedly is that tort
costs are synonymous with state-levied taxes. Besides being little
more than self-serving rhetoric, substituting tort costs for taxes in its
152. See BEACON HILL INSTITUTE, supra note 147, at 60.
153. Commercial liability here refers to litigation between businesses. See id. at 89.
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econometric models compounds the distorted views regarding the
"likely" impact of tort reform upon such economic indicators as em-
ployment, new capital, and tax revenues. The study's authors go to
great pains to show the theoretical similarities between tort costs
and taxes. Rather than prove this point with either logic or empirical
results, however, the authors rely on faulty assumptions and essen-
tially view the comparison as self-evident, when it clearly is not.
For instance, in their introduction they write: "For analytical pur-
poses, we can characterize the expansion in tort liability as a form of
taxation. To be sure, it is an implicit and not an explicit form of taxa-
tion.'' 54 Later, they "identify expansive tort liability as an implicit
tax not to embrace perplexing language, but because there are well-
developed principles concerning the economic analysis of taxation
that can be extended to the economic analysis of expansive tort liabil-
ity."'55 In other words, the authors admit that they have to label tort
costs as a tax in order for their models to work.
If one takes the position that these costs are not a tax at all, espe-
cially since they are not levied by a government entity to raise reve-
nue, and they may not even be costs as much as transfer payments,
then their econometric modeling is useless. It is a tempting and po-
litically expedient idea for companies to equate any cost of doing
business other than their internal production costs, research and de-
velopment, marketing distribution, and other costs to a "tax," given
the general public's disdain for taxes.
Still, these outside costs, such as insurance costs or the costs of
complying with safety and other regulations, are also part of the pro-
duction costs; they prevent businesses from imposing important costs
on the general public. Just as society picks up the tab for cleaning up
toxic waste that has been left behind by companies failing to adhere
to environmental regulations, so does society ultimately pay for
treatment of negligence victims whose injuries are not fully compen-
sated by tortfeasors. Liability is part of the cost of doing business in
America and in no way resembles a "tax." Professor Rahdert's point,
mentioned earlier, bears repeating:
It is probably not particularly helpful to describe tort law as
though it were tax law. There is a distinct rhetorical flavor to all
arguments about the tort system that use the language of tax-
ation ....
Perhaps the best way to get rid of the rhetoric is to eliminate the
tax metaphor and to view the issues, less metaphorically, in insur-
ance terms instead. From this perspective we have a group of indi-
154. Id. at 2-3.
155. Id. at 31.
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viduals ... who, by virtue of their common behavior, face a com-
mon risk of injury. 5
The Beacon Hill study expends significant space blaming Massa-
chusetts' lack of competitiveness and the decline of its manufacturing
sector on its tort liability system. However, the study relies on argu-
ments about the impact of the tort system on competitiveness that
have been made about the nation, not about an individual state like
Massachusetts. While neutral scholars have refuted the basic prem-
ise advanced regarding the tort system's adverse impact on competi-
tiveness, the idea that national statistics can be extrapolated to an
individual state is dubious, at best, and is inconsistent with the real-
ity of the Massachusetts economy." 7 Massachusetts, according to its
own Department of Economic Development, has been enjoying a con-
siderable economic rebirth. In 1998, for example, the unemployment
rate was 3.3%, 5' duplicating a low last reached ten years earlier. As
a point of comparison, the Massachusetts unemployment rate has
been below the very good national rate for five straight years."19
In addition, 1998 saw an increase of 61,000 jobs, setting a new
state record of 3,225,900, while growth in personal income of Massa-
chusetts residents was the second highest in the nation. Personal in-
come per capita in Massachusetts was the third highest in the na-
tion, 23% above the nation's average. 60 If, as the Beacon Hill study
claims, Massachusetts were suffering a competitiveness problem, it
would not have been third among states-trailing only California
and Texas-in fastest-growing companies and second in fastest-
growing high-tech companies. 6 1 In fact, 93% of high-tech chief execu-
tive officers rated the Massachusetts business climate as "good" or
"outstanding."'6 2 Even the tort reform-oriented Associated Industries
of Massachusetts gave the state a comfortably favorable business
confidence rating.6 3 A report card on the states, developed by the
Corporation for Enterprise Development, gave Massachusetts its
highest rating in "business vitality and development capacity" and
placed it, along with only six other states, none of which were in the
Northeast or considered a large industrial state, on its honor role. 6'
Moreover, investors found nothing wrong with the state's competi-
156. RAHDERT, supra note 144, at 157-58.
157. See supra Part V.A.
158. See Massachusetts Dep't of Econ. Dev., Massachusetts Economic Highlights (vis-
ited May 19, 1999) <http://www.state.ma.us/econkeyindichtm>.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161, See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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tiveness; venture capital investments in Massachusetts rose 40%
from 1996 to 1997.165
Ignoring these achievements, the Beacon Hill study adheres to the
notion that tort costs are a "tax," which is problematic because com-
panies tend to avoid states that have a high-tax burden because they
add to the cost of doing business. The facts in Massachusetts belie
the study's assumption, as do economic indicators, such as the num-
ber of business start-ups, in other states, such as California, New
York, Texas, Florida and Pennsylvania, cited by the Beacon Hill
study' 6 as having the highest total' tort costs. Each of these states ac-
tually have the highest number of business starts, ranking no lower
than seventh among the states. 67 'Obviously, contrary to the Beacon
Hill study's assumption, the tort system the authors decry in those
states has not discouraged new businesses. In fact, data suggests it
may have produced the opposite result.
Another flaw in the argument posed by the Beacon Hill study is
shown by the data presented regarding company relocation. They cite
a survey that questioned manufacturers who opened new plants
about their reasons for locating where they did. Tax considerations
ranked only fifth most important among reasons for plant location in
a regional search; taxes were not given much consideration in local
plant searches.' 68 But the more intriguing result of the survey it cites
authoritatively is that liability or tort system concerns are never
mentioned as a factor, a finding that clearly undermines any argu-
ment that the tort system is the root of all adverse business deci-
sions. In addition, the study cites another survey that looked at areas
of concern to business executives in Massachusetts. Again liability is
not specifically mentioned, though the Beacon Hill study authors
suggest, without foundation, that the perception among executives of
hostility toward business derives in part from current tort law. They
make this leap in logic on the basis of surveys of executives about li-
ability performed by the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness and Associated Industry of Massachusetts. These surveys, not
surprisingly, show the Federation's concern over liability.'69 The
Fishkind Report cites the same national survey for its only Florida-
specific data.
The Beacon Hill study's coup de grace is the chart showing the
economic effects of tort reform using the results from the models. 70 It
165. See id.
166. Seeid. attbl.12.
167. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 547
tbl.853 (1997) (citing DUN & BRADSTREET CORP., A DECADE OF BUSINESS STARTS and
BUSINESS FAILURE RECORD).
168. See BEACON HILL INSTITUTE, supra note 147, at 44-45.
169. See id at 87-88.
170. See id. at vi.
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posits four different tax breaks that might possibly come out of tort-
reform efforts in Massachusetts, and it projects results onto various
economic indicators. These predictions are aptly called "scenarios,"",
because they seem more rooted in fiction than in fact. Scenario I as-
serts that Massachusetts tort costs would fall to the national average
as a result of reforms, even though the authors provide no empirical
evidence to buttress this claim. 172 Scenarios III and IV also suffer
from a lack of empirical evidence to undergird their assumptions. 73
The authors simply make unfounded postulates about the real im-
pact tort reform would have on cost. By using 1970 figures to arrive
at their projections, they are in essence picking a year out of a hat
and guessing accordingly.
The only scenario with an assumption rooted in empirical results
is Scenario II, which uses the Illinois tort-reform efforts as a
model. 74 But the empiricism used in the study is seriously flawed.
According to Beacon Hill, in 1996, the year after comprehensive tort
reform was passed in Illinois, a study of the Cook County tort system
showed a 26.6% drop in the number of tort filings, based on a figure
supplied by tort reform supporters, the Illinois Civil Justice League
(ICJL). Reliance on this figure is misplaced. First, Illinois experi-
enced a flood of tort claims, filed immediately before the law went
into effect to avoid the harshness of the draconian measure.' 71 There-
fore any drop in tort filings was most likely an artificial result of
claims being filed earlier than they otherwise would have been in an
attempt to beat the effective date of the law. Second, and most im-
portant, the Illinois law was enjoined as unconstitutional in its Cook
County implementation-in part in February 1996 and more fully in
May 1996.76 In December 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court invali-
dated the law in toto on constitutional grounds.117 Whatever drop
may or may not have occurred in Cook County tort filings cannot be
said to be a function of the actual operation of the statute there-
because it was not operational for most of the year. The authors of
the Beacon Hill study, nonetheless, use this figure to lessen their tort
cost estimate by 26.6% and use the resulting change in the "tort tax"
171. See id. at 81-82.
172. Seeid.at8l.
173. See id. at 82.
174. Seeid.at8l.
175. See Laura Duncan, A Year Later, Tort Reform Is Changing the Business of Law,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 27, 1996, at 1.
176. See David Bailey, Law Capping Non-Economic Damages Ruled Unconstitutional,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 22, 1996, at 1; David Bailey, Two Tort Law Changes Ruled Un-
constitutional, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 27, 1996, at 1.
177. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E. 2d 1057 (II. 1997).
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to arrive at their misleading and speculative impact figures pre-
sented in Table 1 of their study. 78
Regardless of the validity of the ICJL tort filing change figure,
there is absolutely no reason to believe that a percentage drop in tort
filings will lead to the exact same drop in tort costs. Such reasoning
assumes a one-to-one relationship between filings and tort costs,
which is an indefensible position to take. There are far too many
other factors involved in torts and insurance premiums-award size,
accident rate, and insurance profits, for example-to speculate on the
relationship between filings and costs. In addition, the tort costs that
would be most affected by the drop in tort filings, court and litigation
costs, are not even included in the Beacon Hill study's figures.
The Beacon Hill study sells itself as a serious look at the economic
impact of the tort system. It relies on sophisticated econometric mod-
els adapted from earlier studies on the effect of taxation to give the
impressive veneer of rigor. Without commenting on the merits of
these earlier studies, it is easy to dismiss the Beacon Hill study as
worthless. The study makes the mistaken and popular analogy be-
tween insurance premiums and taxes, wildly inflates the actual costs
of the tort system, and relies on assumptions that have absolutely no
factual or empirical basis. The Beacon Hill study, designed to arrive
at desired results regardless of the evidence it confronts, ultimately
delivers answers that tort reformers want to hear.
B. National Bureau for Economic Research
Albeit on a considerably smaller scale, the Fishkind Report also
attempts to duplicate the study conducted under the auspices of the
National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER), which it calls a
model for these kinds of studies.'7 9 The NBER purports to show that
tort reforms have a positive impact on a state's economy. 10 Confi-
dence in the study is misplaced. The NBER study has never ap-
peared in a peer-reviewed journal, where it would have been sub-
jected to a rigor that is obviously lacking in its marshaling of facts
and analysis. Even so, the study's authors found that tort reform
produced no increases in productivity or employment in either manu-
facturing or health care-the two areas that tort reformers claim are
most hurt by the liability system.
In addition, the NBER researchers could not rule out other possi-
ble reasons for the increased output they claim to have found in
178. See BEACON HILL INSTITUTE, supra note 147, at vi.
179. See Fishkind Report, supra note 24, at 21.
180. See THOMAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF LIABILITY REFORM:
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 2 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
4989, 1995) (examining the relationships between productivity and employment in indus-
try and liability reform).
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states that enacted tort reform, such as tax cuts or demographic
shifts. This failure to account for significant variables that may in-
fluence productivity, employment, and growth undercuts the study's
credibility and its relevance. In fact, the authors themselves recog-
nize this flaw. In their conclusion, they write:
However, the results are also consistent with three other alter-
native hypotheses. First, the observed association between liability
law and productivity and employment may be due to other state-
level public policies that are correlated with both the instruments
and the status of liability law but not captured by the fixed effects.
For example, politically conservative states or states with high
densities of lawyers may adopt policies other than liability reforms
that increase employment or productivity.'81
Without accounting for these other effects, the authors cannot au-
thoritatively claim that liability reform leads to increased economic
output. Indeed, one does not have to be an economist to recognize
that the tax structure of a state and other efforts made to attract and
keep businesses are more likely to have a large effect on productivity
and employment levels.
Another limitation of the NBER study is that it treats all tort re-
forms as equally effective. For instance, it is impossible to tell from
the study whether damage caps work better or even differently than
do changes in joint and several liability. A conclusion that treats
each type of tort reform the same is extremely implausible. Instead of
separately examining the effects of different tort reforms, the authors
combine them into a single variable. 18 2 They simply count the num-
ber of tort reforms a state has in place and use that figure to test for
effects on productivity and growth. 83 There is no indication of which
reforms are effective; instead they assume that the more reforms you
have, the more effect there appears to be.184 The suggestion that all
tort reforms are created equal and that piling them on constitutes
good economic strategy is grossly at odds with other studies. For in-
stance, in its review of the literature regarding the effectiveness of
malpractice reform efforts, the United States Congress Office of
Technology Assessment found that studies showed various reforms
had discernibly different effects. 88
One of the NBER study's authors, Daniel Kessler, noted the limi-
tation of his study in an interview with the ABA Journal: "This paper
is not the fnal word on anything. It doesn't give us an answer, but
181. Id. at 28.
182. See id. at 11.
183. See id. at 18.
184. See id. at 19.
185. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BP-H-119 IMPACT OF
LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 73 (1993).
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the results do suggest that this is worth looking into."'1 6 The Fish-
kind Report treats the study as the final word, despite Mr. Kessler's
contrary declaration.
VI. THE STRENGTH OF THE FLORIDA EcoNoMY
Despite the doomsday rhetoric of the tort reformers that is in-
tended to justify the changes enacted by the new law, the Florida
economy has been doing quite well, especially when compared with
neighboring states. At the same time the legislature was sprinting
toward tort reform, Governor Jeb Bush declared that the state was
"remarkably strong. Incomes are growing, unemployment is low, and
in the last two and a half years alone, over 110,000 Florida families
have left the welfare rolls, a decline of over [fifty] percent!"' 87 These
declarations should not be treated as mere political puffery; Bush's
claims were not a reflection on his then-incipient leadership of the
state, but on his Democratic predecessor.
The empirical data bears out this pride in the state economy. Flor-
ida's gross state product (GSP) rose from $273 billion in 1990 to
$326.1 billion in 1996 (in 1992 dollars), an increase of 19.5%."s Dur-
ing the same time period, while the nation was experiencing an eco-
nomic boom, its gross domestic product (GDP) rose only 14.5%.18
Employment trends were similarly favorable. Unemployment in
Florida fell from 5.5% to 5.1% between 1995 and 1996, while the na-
tional rate fell only from 5.6% to 5.4%. 190 Florida Trend reported that
in May 1996, Florida's unemployment rate fell further to 4.9%, with
metropolitan areas such as Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa-St. Peters-
burg, Gainesville and Tallahassee experiencing a rate below 4%.191
Another important economic indicator is new businesses, where
Florida, with more than 13,000 new businesses begun in 1997,
ranked third in the country, behind only California and New York. 9
186. Geoffirey A. Campbell, Study: Business Booms After Tort Reform Enacted, A.B.A.
J., Jan. 1996, at 28 (emphasis added).
187. Governor John Ellis "Jeb" Bush, State of the State Address (Mar. 2, 1999), FLA.
H.R. JOUR. 11, 11 (Reg. Seas. 1999), available at <http://www.state.fl.usleog/
speeches remarks/3-2-99_sosaddress.html> (visited Apr. 5, 2000).
188. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 454,
tbl.719 (1998) (citing U.S. BUREAu OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS
(June 1998)).
189. See id.
190. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 397,
tbl.621 (1996) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GEOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT (1995)); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 401 tbl.626 (1997).
191. See Tom Fullerton, Retailing's Uncertain Outlook, FLA. TREND, Sept. 1996, at 17.
192. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 553
tbl.878 (1998) (citing DUN & BRADSTREET CORP., A DECADE OF BUSINESS STARTS and
BUSINESS FAILURE RECORD).
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Enterprise Florida, a public-private partnership organized to im-
prove the economic quality of life in Florida, Florida has noted:
[Florida] leads the nation in the number of incorporations and was
designated by Business Facilities magazine in its May 1997 issue
to be the best place in the nation to expand a business.... In 1997,
20 of Money magazine's top 80 communities with the highest qual-
ity of life were in Florida. For these and other reasons, corpora-
tions are moving to Florida in increasing numbers to take advan-
tage of the state's assets and resources. 193
Enterprise Florida goes on to state:
In recent years, Florida has emerged as one of the world's fastest
growing markets, experiencing an explosion of international
growth as a major economic hub of the Southeastern United
States. With a gross state product of $368.9 billion, if the State of
Florida were a sovereign nation, it would rank as the world's 16th
largest market economy and [fifth] in the Americas." 4
As a marketplace, Florida is also a leading state, suffering no ad-
verse effects from the nature of its legal system. The business press
has celebrated its positioning for business. Expansion Management
indicated that "[tihe structure is in place for the state to continue its
leadership in the medical devices industry, and to take off in bio-
technology."19 It is ranked third, behind only California and Texas,
as a location for health technology businesses. 19 Furthermore, along
with Texas, Florida also boasts one of "the most profitable banking
markets anywhere.' ' 9
7
In another area of economic evaluation, personal income, Florida
continues to perform well. The Bureau of Economic and Business Re-
search found that Florida's per capita personal income, which grew
5.1% in 1996, outpaced both the national average of 4.8% growth and
the Southeast region's rate of 4.7%.19
Housing starts are another key economic indicator to determine
the strength of an economy. The building and purchase of homes
sends positive ripples throughout the economy, as producers of raw
193. Enterprise Florida, Doing Business in Florida (1999) (document previously pub-
lished on the World Wide Web, on file with author).
<http://www.floridabusiness.com/advantages/climate.html>.
194. Id.
<http://www.floridabusiness.com/advantages/economy.html>.
195. Lance Yoder, Florida Assembles Winning Pieces in Health Technology Puzzle,
EXPANSION MGMT., Mar. 1999, at 1.
196. See id.
197. Kyle Parks, Finding Ways to Make Money, FLORIDA TREND, Jan. 1997, at 44.
198. See Press Release from Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of
Florida, Florida Personal Income Release (June 25, 1999) (citing U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis), available at <http://www.BEBR.ufl.edu/PressRelease/fpi.htm> (visited Apr. 5,
2000).
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materials, builders, contractors, and the makers of products used to
fill the home with furniture and appliances all see an increase in
business. Florida's housing market has been booming.'" Florida was
first in the nation in housing starts in 1996, with the starts spread
well between large metropolitan areas and smaller cities and
towns.
200
One economic observer concluded:
The sun still shines a little brighter on Florida's economic land-
scape than elsewhere. The slowdown in the national economy
barely cast a shadow through much of Florida, which saw gross
state product (GSP) expand at a robust 5% pace during 1995. Em-
ployment and income continued to rise and commercial vacancy
rates dropped to their lowest levels in nearly a decade. Job seekers
and retirees continued to flock to the State, pushing Florida's
population to more than 14 million.
Florida's economic outlook remains one of the brightest in the na-
tion and should remain so through the rest of the decade.20
John M. Godfrey, an adjunct professor of economics and finance at
Jacksonville University, opines that Florida's performance in all the
key economic drivers will keep the economy healthy in the foresee-
able future. "Without exception, all [polled economists] believed that
Florida will again outperform the nation by a significant margin in
the coming year." He writes, "Florida's business can take some com-
fort, as well as pride, in knowing that its market will experience
some of the nation's best economic conditions in 1996 and beyond."20 2
While the Fishkind Report and tort reformers in general ignored
the robust Florida economy, they did place all their marbles on in-
surance costs. Here, too, there is no support for their dire descrip-
tions of the state of the Florida insurance industry. Florida's overall
insurance profitability has remained steady, with an average return
on net worth of 11% from 1988-1997.201 During the last five years of
that period, which saw losses drop and profits rise further, Florida
outperformed Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. 20 4 Similar re-
199. See John M. Dunn, Construction: More Work, Less Profit, FLA. TREND, Jan. 1997,
at 52.
200. See id.
201. Mark P. Vitner, Florida Continues to Shine, FLA. TREND, May 1996, at 6, 8. Mark
Vitner is vice president and an economist at First Union Capital Markets Group in Char-
lotte, NC.
202. John M. Godfrey, Pretty Picture, FLA. TREND, Aug. 1996, at 16.
203. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE IN 1997
(1998) (excluding figures from 1992 in which catastrophic losses were suffered due to Hur-
ricane Andrew).
204. See id.
20001
436 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:397
suits were obtained with respect to private-passenger liability cover-
age, with Florida's return on net worth averaging 9.9% from 1988-
1997 and experiencing even greater profits from 1993-1997, again
outperforming the states listed previously.2 5 For commercial auto-
mobile liability, Florida posted an average return on net worth of
9.03% from 1988-1997 and again outperformed Alabama and Geor-
gia.20
6
These figures have made the Florida insurance market one of the
most profitable in the country. Before the Florida Senate Committee
on Banking and Finance, at the same time the legislature was rush-
ing to enact tort reform, Insurance Commissioner Bill Nelson testi-
fied:
Despite its hurricane risk, the Conning [& Company] study [of the
property and casualty market in all fifty states] ranks Florida's in-
surance market number one in the country in desirability as a
place to [sic] business in commercial lines and number three in
personal lines. And no other big state was even in the top ten.20 7
In fact, profitability was so high that Nelson ordered a June 1998
reduction in rates from four major insurers because of success in
fighting insurance fraud and crackdowns on drunk drivers.2 8 Insur-
ers and regulators agreed that "overall claims are on the decline in
frequency and severity. 20 9
The vice president of the Florida Insurance Council, the industry's
lobbying arm, forecast a record year in 1997 and saw a robust and
profitable market down the road.210 It is clear that no insurance crisis
engulfed the state.
VII. THE DETERRENT EFFECT
One of the many failures of the tort-reform reports that pass as
studies, especially those that make the "tort tax" claim, is their fail-
ure to ascribe any benefits to the tort system. Primary among these
benefits is the deterrent effect that it has on negligent behavior and
unsafe products. Conservative law-and-economics scholar and federal
appellate judge, Richard Posner, has noted that "although there has
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Bill Nelson, Florida Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, Remarks Before the
Florida Senate Committee on Banking and Finance (Mar. 3, 1999), available at
<http://www.doi.state.fl.us/Consumers/Alerts/remarks.html> (visited Apr. 5, 2000).
208. See Press Release from Fla. Dep't of Ins., Insurance Rates to Fall Again for Many
Drivers (Jun. 12, 1998), available at <http://www.doi.state.fl.us/Consumers/AlertsPress
/1998/pr061298.html> (visited Oct. 5, 1999).
209. Id.
210. See David Villano, Reversal of Fortune, FLA. TREND, Jan. 1997, at 42.
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been little systematic study of the deterrent effect of tort law, what
empirical evidence there is indicates that tort law likewise deters."211
One industry in which consumers have clearly seen safety benefits
derived from the tort system is the automobile industry. The tort sys-
tem, coupled with consumer safety efforts and increased regulation,
has led to the withdrawal of unsafe cars, such as the Corvair, and the
development and subsequent improvement of new safety devices. In
an analysis of the impact of product liability on automobile safety,
John D. Graham found that while liability may not be the sole factor
in leading to safety improvements in cars, it may act as a catalyst
and quicken the process through which safety features are developed
and implemented. 12 Graham notes, for instance, that "the installa-
tion of rear-seat shoulder belts and the phaseout of belt tension re-
lievers may have been hastened by liability considerations."1 3 At
times, Graham continues, liability risk may have been enough to
spark safety improvements even when other factors, such as regula-
tion and professional responsibility, were not present.2 14
Another interesting finding by Graham, especially in light of tort
reformers' claims that liability concerns impose an undue financial
burden on manufacturers, is that the cost of liability is not all that
important to industry: "The direct financial costs of liability are usu-
ally a relatively minor factor, at least from the perspective of large
manufacturers."1 ' What is more injurious to manufacturers is the
adverse publicity that accompanies product liability suits, which may
lessen consumer demand for unsafe products 2 6 and provide tort law
with a considerable amount of its deterrent power.
When Ford Motor Company introduced the Pinto in the early
1970s, it situated the gas tank in such a way that the car was in se-
vere danger of explosion in rear-end collisions.2 1 7 People were killed
211. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 10 (1987).
212. See John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehile Safety, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120, 180 (Pe-
ter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). Professor Gary Schwartz agrees with this idea
of interaction:
An added observation is that insofar as there are various safety incentives that
might serve as alternatives to tort, tort law has the capacity to interact with
those other incentives in a beneficial way. For example, a party's basic sense of
morality can be reinforced by the prospect of liability: A product designer might
say that "this is the right thing to do; besides, it will reduce the risk of my com-
pany's liability."
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort La w: Does Tort LawReally De-
ter, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 384-85 (1994) (citation omitted).
213. Graham, supra note 211, at 181.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 182.
216. See id. at 181, 182.
217. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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as a result of this design defect.2 1 Ford knew there was a problem
with the location of the gas tank and that it could be easily reme-
died.21 9 In every crash test of at least twenty-five miles per hour, the
fuel tank ruptured, causing leakage that violated federal regula-
tions.220 Yet, in order to save money, they deferred the safety im-
provement, a fuel bladder, for two years. 22 ' In upholding a punitive
award of $3.25 million, which had been reduced from $125 million,
the appellate court said:
Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's
fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious in-
jury or death in a 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collision. There was evi-
dence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects
at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings
by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and
limbs against corporate profits. Ford's institutional mentality was
shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety. There was
substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted "conscious
disregard" of the probability of injury to members of the consuming
public.222
Ford compounded this indifference by petitioning the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) to abandon
or postpone fuel tank regulations, arguing that the standard would
force American manufacturers to spend $137.5 million to prevent an
estimated 360 deaths and injuries from occurring, which Ford calcu-
lated to be worth only $49.5 million. 23 In other words, Ford engaged
in a cost-benefit analysis accepting that it might ultimately be held
liable for $49.5 million in damages, resulting in a savings to the cor-
poration of $88 million, by not correcting the fuel tank problem. The
tort system, with its threat of punitive damages, is designed to pre-
vent corporations from making such callous calculations about the
value of human lives.
Here, the liability judgment forced Ford to make important insti-
tutional changes to improve product safety. Still, other companies
that have exhibited a callous disregard for consumer safety have
been hauled into court.2 2 4 Chrysler, for example, chose not to make
218. See id. at 359.
219. Seeid.at361.
220. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center ofProd-
uct Liability, 60 MO. L. REv. 1, 78 (1995) (explaining the facts that were disclosed prior to
a ruling against Ford Motor Co. in a product liability suit).
221. See Michael L. Rustad, How the Common Good Is Served by the Remedy of Puni-
tive Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793, 825 (1997) (arguing that punitive damages effectively
encourage product manufacturers to consider the public health impacts of their decisions).
222. Orimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
223. See Bogus, supra note 219, at 78-79.
224. Ford was not the only automaker that cut corners on fuel-tank safety. GM pro-
duced millions of pick-up trucks with dangerous side-saddle gas tanks from 1973 to 1987.
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an inexpensive adjustment to a minivan doorlatch, which resulted in
the death of a ten-year-old boy.22 From 1984 to 1995, at least thirty-
seven passengers were ejected and killed from Chrysler minivans
whose rear lift gates had opened, according to the NHTSA.226 Evi-
dence at the wrongful-death trial of the little boy showed that Chrys-
ler knew the rear gate latch was defective, that the latch design had
not been used in any automobile in twenty years, and that it had de-
stroyed documents and crash-test results related to the latch . 2 7
Though Chrysler knew that the latch could be strengthened for as
little as twenty-five cents per van in 1990, it did not do so "because
the move would have undercut Chrysler's position with safety regu-
lators that there was no problem with the latches." 228
In a striking similarity to the Ford Pinto case, an internal memo-
randum, which revealed the company's disregard for consumer
safety, became a smoking gun. The memorandum disclosed Chrys.
ler's attempt to use political muscle in Congress to prevent a federal
recall. The December 9, 1994, memo from a top company official to
Chrysler chairman, Robert Eaton, and president Robert Lutz stated
that officials from the NHTSA "told the auto maker that the latch
problem 'is a safety defect that involves children."' 29
The memo noted that... Chrysler's vice president for Washington
affairs[ ] suggested that '[Chrysler] mount an aggressive effort in
Washington to prevent the adverse use of bureaucratic power
within NHTSA, specifically their funding from Congress, the proc-
ess which allows NHTSA to design tests for the public record that
play to the media and trial lawyers before ruling on a defect...'
The memo concluded: 'If we want to use political pressure to try
to squash a recall letter [from the NHTSA], we need to go now.23
These two examples are part of a legion of instances where law-
suits have forced the adoption of important safety features. There
are, of course, many more. Without the threat of meaningful tort ac-
tions, irresponsible companies have little financial incentive to make
needed safety modifications.
The trucks were vulnerable to catastrophic explosions during side-impact collisions. See id.
at 81. This design defect has been alleged to have resulted in the death of more than 300
people, but GM settled these cases rather than institute an expensive recall of the vehicles.
See id. At one trial, former GM engineers testified that GM knew as early as 1980 from its
own crash tests that the fuel tank design was indefensible, and that GM lawyers had col-
lected and shredded damning documents. See id
225. See Milo Geyelin, Costly Verdict: Why One Jury Dealt a Big Blow to Chrysler in
Minivan-Latcb Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1997, at Al.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. Nichole M. Christian et al., Chrysler Is Told to Pay $262.5 Million by Jurors in
Minivan-Accident Trial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1997, at A6.
230. Id.
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Other industries, such as the chemical industry, have made sig-
nificant safety improvements as a result of liability exposure.23 1 Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) professors Ashford and
Stone found that the tort system has not only stimulated the devel-
opment of safer products and processes, but it also has spurred
significant technological innovations that have resulted in chemical
hazard reduction. 232 As a result of the Bhopal disaster, in which
thousands were killed when a Union Carbide plant emitted deadly
methyl isocyanate gas into the surrounding area, many chemical
firms reduced the amount of dangerous chemicals stored near popu-
lation centers. Major chemical manufacturers such as Dow Chemical,
Hoffman-LaRoche, Monsanto, and Dupont have all used less deadly
chemicals in their processing or have improved their chemical con-
tainment practices. 2 3 Another commentator details some of the in-
dustry-wide changes made, in part because of toxic tort liability wor-
ries:
In the aftermath of Bhopal, many American companies reevalu-
ated their operating risks. Companies worked to reduce their on-
site stockpiles of hazardous chemicals and to better monitor the
remaining stocks.... Many companies more closely scrutinized the
transport of chemicals to and from their plants. Shipments are
now more often routed through less-populous areas. To further re-
duce transport hazards, some companies have created on-site fa-
cilities for producing materials they formerly shipped in. Others
participate more in community-education programs about the
products being made, and many have developed or revised detailed
community notification and evacuation plans in the event of a ma-
jor emergency. Finally, more firms have engaged consultants to
study the reduction of risk in the handling of hazardous sub-
stances.
2 34
After extensively studying the effect of the tort system on chemi-
cal liability and innovation, Ashford and Stone came to the conclu-
sion that the reforms suggested by traditional tort reformers are se-
riously misplaced:
These observations and conclusions indicate that the recent de-
mands for widespread tort reform, while directing attention to dis-
satisfaction with the tort system, tend to miss their mark, since
significant underdeterrence already exists. Thus proposals that
231. See Nicholas A. Ashford & Robert F. Stone, Liability, Innovation, and Safety in
the Chemical Industry, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY
AND INNOVATION 367 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
232. See id. at 368.
233. See id. at 400.
234. Rollin B. Johnson, The Impact of Liability on Innovation in the Chemical Indus-
try, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION
428, 449 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
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damage awards be capped, that limitations be placed on pain and
suffering and punitive damages, and that stricter evidence be re-
quired for recovery should be rejected. On the contrary, the revi-
sions of the tort system should include relaxing the evidentiary re-
quirements for recovery, shifting the basis of recovery to subclini-
cal effects of chemicals, and establishing clear causes of action
where evidence of exposure exists in the absence of manifest dis-
ease.
235
While other commentators, especially Peter W. Huber, have sug-
gested that liability discourages innovation, a common refrain of the
tort reform movement, others recognize that tort liability does have
safety incentive effects. 2 36 Another scholar, Rollin B. Johnson of Har-
vard University, argues that the current liability system may provide
incentives for safety and innovation. Johnson further argues that at-
tempts to change the system may do more harm than good:
It would be difficult to argue that the uncertainty and unpredict-
ability of the tort system does not affect business planning to some
degree. And some risk-averse companies may decide to abandon
certain lines of research and development because of concern over
liability, leaving those areas open to foreign competitors. But such
actions arguably increase the average safety of products, while
preserving opportunities for American competitors willing to as-
sume the risk and creating incentives for producers to innovate to
make alternative and even safer products.
On the whole, it is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the
disadvantages of the present system and even more difficult to
weigh them against the advantages of the deterrence they provide
against the introduction of truly hazardous products. Furthermore,
the possibility of an occasional "excessive" award may provide
greater deterrent value at lower net cost to society than univer-
sally applicable regulations do. . . . The liability system might
benefit from some fine-tuning to make the system more respon-
sive, less expensive, and more equitable. But such attempts may
actually make it less effective.237
Indeed, the common claim that the tort system inhibits the devel-
opment of new products, and thus leads to economic stagnation or
reduced competitiveness, seems misguided. As Rahdert points out,
"[tlhe rapid proliferation of new products and services in our econ-
235. Ashford & Stone, supra note 230, at 419.
236. See generally W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, An Industrial Profile of the
Links Between Product Liability and Innovation, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 81 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991).
237. Johnson, supra note 234, at 450.
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omy is ample evidence that stagnation due to tort liability is the
exception, not the rule.123
Experience in the pharmaceutical industry is consistent with
these conclusions.23 9 In her study of prescription drug safety, Judith
Swazey interviewed pharmaceutical company attorneys, who cred-
ited the product-liability system with providing a deterrent which
has, in turn, led to safety improvements. One attorney she inter-
viewed remarked,
For certain classes of drugs, liability concerns have probably led to
safer products, in conjunction with FDA requirements .... I per-
sonally don't think that the litigation threat is that serious .... I
believe-though it's heretical-that the liability crisis is largely a
myth when one looks at available information such as the actual
number of cases .... Tort law is a law of what ought to be-
compensation for injury and, when warranted, punishment.'"
Another product liability attorney working for a pharmaceutical
company agreed: "Overall, I think liability has had a deterrent effect
for industry with respect to drug safety; safety has been improved as
a result of causes of action under negligence."241
Risk managers, those responsible for reducing liability exposure
for companies, associations, governmental units, and other organiza-
tions, may have a valid perspective on whether tort law actually de-
ters risk. Professor Gary Schwartz interviewed risk managers for
several public agencies in California, including city managers, state
motor vehicle department managers, and managers from the UCLA
Medical Center. He asked them about the impact of liability on their
safety efforts, or whether the impetus to improve safety was simply a
desire to do the right thing. He found:
All of them emphasized that their efforts were due to the combina-
tion of both. A risk manager starts with the idea that accident
avoidance is good for its own sake. But the prospect of tort liability
provides an important reinforcement as well as an essential way to
sell the risk manager's proposals to others in the organization. 2 42
In fact, this need to sell to others in an organization can iteslf be a
function of the search for cost savings. As one Los Angeles city man-
ager explained to Schwartz, officials "are not much affected by ab-
stract appeals to safety. Indeed, funding will generally be denied
238. RAHDERT, supra note 144, at 161.
239. See generally Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability,
in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAw ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 291
(Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
240. Id. at 297.
241. Id.
242. Schwartz, supra note 211, at 415-16.
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'unless we can tie it to cost savings for the City.' 243 Schwartz found
one risk manager, the director of Non-Profit Risk Management,
started his job with considerable skepticism over whether the tort
system effectively deterred, but his job experiences led him to believe
that "tort liability exerts a significant influence."1
2
"
Similar results were obtained in a survey of risk managers for ma-
jor corporations by the business-oriented Conference Board, which
"found not only significant safety improvements on account of prod-
ucts liability, but also that the negative effects of products liability
were not substantial. 1245 The survey noted that, of 232 major corpora-
tions, concerns about products liability encouraged approximately
22% to improve manufacturing procedures, 32% to improve product
safety design, and 37% to improve labeling.246 The appearance of the
first survey, which countered tort reformers' arguments that the li-
ability system was ruining American businesses, prompted a second
survey of 2,000 corporate CEO's, a third of whom, despite a self-
interest in tort reform, admitted that they had improved the safety of
products and nearly one-half of whom improved their product warn-
ings.247
Schwartz himself attempted a cost-benefit analysis of tort habil-
ity, focusing on the medical malpractice system, though in a self-
admittedly conservative fashion. By comparing the cost of medical
malpractice insurance and the estimated cost of practice changes due
to liability, with the Harvard medical malpractice study estimate
that medical injuries had been reduced by 11% and the number of
medically negligent injuries by 29%, Schwartz concluded:
Given the $130 billion total for actual medical injuries in 1984, the
malpractice system can be understood as having reduced the cost
of injuries by $19.5 billion. Since this estimated safety benefit is
considerably higher than the $15 billion estimated cost of the
medical malpractice regime, that regime seems to have been cost-
justified. 248
VIII. CONCLUSION
Tort reform is an idea that has been so fervently adopted by the
business community that it has lost all basis in reality. "Reforms" are
desired more as a trophy on a mantelpiece2 49 than in furtherance of
243. Id. at 416 n.196 (citation omitted).
244. Id. at 416.
245. Id. at 409.
246. See id. at 408-09.
247. See id. at 409.
248. Id. at 440.
249. In the aftermath of the passage of House Bill 775, one industry lobbyist declared,
"I don't know what the poor people got, but the rich people are happy, and I'm ready to go
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any demonstrated need. Legislation such as House Bill 755 is con-
structed in an air of supposition and lack of understanding. Two
scholars recently and correctly observed that:
Current tort reform is a blunderbuss. Based on anecdote and de-
signed to favor defendants, reform measures fail to address the
tort system as it stands .... Rather than heed those [unsubstanti-
ated and demonstrably false] fictions, legislators and voters should
turn their attention to our growing knowledge of how the tort sys-
tem truly operates.
250
The empirical evidence demonstrates that the tort system's sub-
stantial benefits outweigh the relatively small costs that may legiti-
mately be charged to it. Instead, the data demonstrates that the civil
justice system still provides the best opportunity for an average per-
son to achieve redress of injuries against wrongdoers, regardless of
wealth or rank. As The Economist has reported:
So much fury is levelled at litigation in America that the merits of
its civil justice system are often forgotten. Unlike in Britain, al-
most anyone can uphold his rights in the courts. That means re-
dress for consumers against unscrupulous firms and protection for
voters against unaccountable public officials. Neither should be
sacrificed lightly.
25
'
home." Lucy Morgan, Bill Flurry Gives Bush Happiness and Worry, ST. PETE. TIMES, May
1, 1999, at 7B (quote of lobbyist J.M. "Mac" Stipanovich commenting on the measures
passed by the Florida Legislature during the 1999 session).
250. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? Now
Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 398 (1999).
251. The Way Those Crazy Americans Do It, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1995, at 29 (British
ed.).
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APPENDIX I
Ch. 99-225 vs. CS/SB 874 (1998) vs. HB 2117 (1997)
The issues appear in the order in which they appear in ch. 99-225.
The numbers correspond to the sections in the Act. Issues present in
the earlier bills that do not appear in ch. 99-225 are at the end of the
table and are unnumbered.
Ch. 99-225, Laws of Fla.
(Became Law)
CS/SB 874 (1998)1
(Enacted/Vetoed)
HB 2117 "FAIR" (1997)2
(Died)
A. Issues in the 1999 Bill
1. Jury Reform
Provides a series of jury 9 Provides a series of jury * Not addressed.
reform measures to in- reform measures to in-
form and instruct jurors. form and instruct jurors,
allow greater participa-
tion by the jurors in civil
trials, to include the pro-
vision of juror notebooks
in civil trials likely to ex-
ceed 5 days, and allow ju-
rors to direct written
questions to witnesses.
2. Mediation
* Provides for mandatory Provides for mandatory * Not addressed.
mediation in most types of mediation in most types of
civil actions for damages civil actions for damages
(provides certain excep- (provides certain excep-
tions). tions).
3. Voluntary Trial Resolution
" Provides that by mutual * Provides that by mutual * Not addressed.
agreement parties may agreement parties may
submit matter in dispute submit matter in dispute
to voluntary trial resolu- to voluntary trial resolu-
tion by a private judge. tion by a private judge.
" Specifies procedures for * Specifies procedures for
voluntary trial resolution voluntary trial resolution
proceedings. proceedings.
" Provides for submission of • Provides for submission of
final decision to circuit final decision to circuit
court for rendition of a fi. court for rendition of a fi-
nal judgment. Provides nal judgment. Provides
for appeal subject to the for appeal subject to the
"harmless error doctrine." "harmless error doctrine."
1. Enrolled; as passed by the Legislature and vetoed by Gov. Chiles.
2. As introduced by the House Committee on Financial Services and Reps. Safley and
Bainter; carried over to the 1998 Session; not heard.
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Ch. 99-225, Laws of Fla.
(Became Law)
Provides for enforcement
of judgments.
CS/SB 874 (1998)1 HB 2117 "FAIR" (1997)2
(Enacted/Vetoed) (Died)
Provides for enforcement
of judgments.
4. Frivolous Claims & Defenses
" Revises standards appli- * Revises standards appli- * Not addressed.
cable to what constitutes cable to what constitutes
a frivolous claim or de- a frivolous claim or de-
fense subject to sanction fense subject to sanction
under § 57.105. under § 57.105.
" Provides sanctions for * Provides sanctions for
acts taken primarily for acts taken primarily for
the purpose of unreason- the purpose of unreason-
able delay. able delay.
5. Expert Witnesses
" Prohibits taxing expert * Prohibits taxing expert * Not addressed.
witness costs under § witness costs under §
57.071 unless certain in- 57.071 unless certain in-
formation is provided to formation is provided to
the opposing party. the opposing party.
" Requires party retaining * Requires the party retain.
the expert to furnish a re- ing the expert to provide
port summarizing the information about the ex-
opinions and the factual pert's expertise and com-
basis therefor to the op- pensation within 30 days
posing party at 5 days after entry of the order
prior to the deposition or setting the trial date.
at least 20 days prior to Requires party retaining
discovery cut-off, which. the expert to furnish a re-
ever is sooner, or as de- port summarizing the
termined by the court. opinions and the factual
basis therefor to the op-
posing party at least 10
days prior to discovery
cut-off, 45 days prior to
trial, or as determined by
the court.
6. Expedited Trials
" Provides a procedure for * Provides a procedure for * Not addressed.
expedited resolution of expedited resolution of
civil actions upon joint civil actions upon joint
stipulation of the parties. stipulation of the parties.
" Specifies shortened time e Specifies shortened time
frames, limitations on frames, limitations on
discovery, and limitations discovery, and limitations
on conducting the trial, on conducting the trial.
" Prohibits continuances * Prohibits continuances
absent extraordinary cir- absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances. cumstances.
7. Itemized Verdicts
- Repeals current require-
ment in § 768.77(2) that
verdict form include
itemization of past and
future damages.
Repeals current require-
ment in § 768.77(2) that
verdict form include
itemization of past and
future damages.
* Not addressed.
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(Became Law)
CS/SB 874(1998)1 HB 2117 FAIW (1997)2
(Enacted/Vetoed) (Died)I
8. Periodic Payments
Provides that periodic * Provides that periodic * Not addressed.
payment provisions of § payment provisions of §
768.78 apply when the 768.78 apply when the
court (rather than the court (rather than the
trier of fact) determines trier of fact) determines
that an award by the jury that an award by the jury
includes future economic includes future economic
losses in excess of losses in excess of
$250,000. $250,000.
9. Venue
• Declares as void any pro- Declares as void any pro- * Not addressed.
vision in a real property vision in a real property
improvement contract improvement contract
that requires an action that requires an action
against a resident con- against a resident con-
tractor be brought outside tractor be brought outside
the state, the state.
10. Case Data Collection
- Requires the Office of the . Requires the Office of the • Not addressed.
State Court Administra. State Court Administra-
tor to collect information tor to collect information
on settlements, jury ver- on settlements, jury ver-
dicts, and final judgments dicta, and final judgments
in negligence cases, in negligence cases.
11. Products Liability-Statute of Repose
" Creates a products liabil-
ity statute of repose run-
ning 12 years from the
date of sale unless manu-
facturer has represented
that the product has an
expected useful life of
longer than 10 years in
which case the repose pe-
riod runs to the end of the
expected useful life.
" Contains conflicting pro-
visions regarding aircraft
in commercial or contract
service that state there is
either no repose period or
a 20-year repose period
(unless the manufacturer
warrants a longer ex-
pected useful life).
" Exception for escalators,
elevators, and improve-
ments to real property,
and 20-year repose period
for vessels.
" Provides that there is no
repose period for a prod-
uct if exposure to the
" Creates in § 95.031 a
products liability statute
of repose running 12
years from date of deliv-
ery of the product to the
first purchaser.
" Provides an exception for
concealment of known de-
fects by the manufacturer
and for latent defects
where the exposure occurs
within the 12-year period,
but the injury does not
manifest itself until after
the period has run.
* Creates in § 95.031 a
products liability statute
of repose running 12
years from date of deliv-
ery of the product to the
first purchaser.
" No exceptions.
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Ch. 99-225, Laws of Fla.
(Became Law)
CS/SB 874 (1998)1
(EnactedNetoed)
HB 2117 "FAIR" (1997)2
(Died)
product occurs within 12-
years of sale, but the in-
jury does not manifest it-
self until after the repose
period.
" Provides for tolling during
concealment of defects by
a manufacturer but re-
quires proof of the manu-
facturer's actual knowl-
edge of defect and af-
firmative steps to conceal.
" Effective July 1, 1999.
12. Statue of Repose - Barred Actions
- Actions that would not * Actions that would not • Actions that would not
have been barred under have been barred under have been barred under
prior law (i.e., involving prior law (i.e., involving prior law (i.e., involving
products already on the products already on the products already on the
market) must be brought market) must be brought market) must be brought
by July 1, 2003. by July 1, 2003. by July 1, 1998.
13. Products Liability - Defenses
- Expands the prohibition * Not addressed. * Not addressed.
against the use of evi-
dence of subsequent re-
medial measures to prove
negligence.
14. Products Liability - Defenses
* Requires the finder of fact * Not addressed. * Not addressed.
to consider the state of
the art of scientific and
technical knowledge at
the time of manufacture,
not at the time of injury.
15. Products Liability - Defenses
" Provides for a rebuttable * Provides for a rebuttable • Not addressed.
presumption of no liabil- presumption of no liabil-
ity based upon compliance ity based upon compliance
with government rules at with government rules at
time of manufacture, time of manufacture.
" Provides for a rebuttable • Broad language encom-
presumption that a prod- passes medical devices
uct is defective if it is not and drugs subject to FDA
in compliance with gov- approval.
ernment rules at time of
manufacture.
• Broad language encom-
passes medical devices
and drugs subject to FDA
approval.
16. Negligent Hiring
• Provides that an employer
is presumed not negligent
in hiring an employee
* Provides that an employer - Not addressed.
is presumed not negligent
in hiring an employee
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(Became Law)
who commits an inten-
tional tort causing death
or injury if the employer
conducted a pre-
employment background
check that did not reveal
information demonstrat-
ing the employee's un-
suitability for the work.
" Specifies required ele.
ments of the background
check.
" Specifies that the failure
to conduct a background
check does not raise a
presumption.
CS/SB 874 (1998)1 HB 2117 "FAIR" (1997)2
(Enacted/Vetoed) (Died)
who commits an inten.
tional tort causing death
or injury if the employer
conducted a pre-
employment background
check that did not reveal
information demonstrat-
ing the employee's un-
suitability for the work.
" Specifies required ele-
ments of the background
check.
" Specifies that the failure
to conduct a background
check does not raise a
presumption.
17. Job Reference Information
" Extends current immu- • Extends current immu- * Not addressed.
nity provision in § nity provision in §
768.095 with regard to 768.095 with regard to
employer disclosure of in- employer disclosure of in-
formation to include cur- formation to include cur-
rent as well as former rent as well as former
employees, employees.
" Provides for immunity Provides for immunity
unless it is shown by clear unless it is shown by clear
and convincing evidence and convincing evidence
that the information was that the information was
knowingly false, knowingly false.
18. Business Premises Liability
o Gives owners of conven- * Specifies nine types of se-
ience stores a presump- curity measures applying
tion against liability if to commercial real prop-
they comply with the erty and gives a business
statutorily required secu- property owner who im-
rity measures specified in plements any six of same
§§ 812.173 and 812.174. a presumption that it has
fulfilled any duty to pro-
vide adequate security for
invitees with respect to
criminal acts committed
by non-employees against
such persons in common
areas, parking areas and
portions of the premises
not occupied by buildings
or structures.
" Specifies that failure to
implement the specified
security measures does
not raise a presumption of
liability.
" Also includes presump-
tion regarding conven-
ience stores that imple-
ments existing statutory
- Not addressed.
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Ch. 99-225, Laws of Fla.
(Became Law)
CS/SB 874 (1998)1 HB 2117 "FAIR" (1997)2
(Enacted/Vetoed) (Died)
security measures.
19. Premises Liability - Trespassers
" Revises the blood alcohol
threshold relating to
landowner immunity with
regard to intoxicated
trespassers in § 768.075
and broadens the acts to
which such immunity ap-
plies.
• Defines and distinguishes
discovered versus undis-
covered trespassers and
specifies that: 1) with re-
gard to undiscovered
trespassers, a landowner
has only to refrain from
intentional misconduct
and has no duty to warn
of dangerous conditions;
2) with regard to discov-
ered trespassers, a land-
owner must refrain from
gross negligence or inten-
tional misconduct and
must warn the trespasser
of known concealed dan-
gerous conditions.
• Includes within the cate-
gory of "discovered tres-
passers" persons detected
by the landowner, or
about whose presence the
landowner was alerted,
within 24 hours preceding
the accident.
" Immunizes a landowner
from any liability for neg-
ligence causing the death
of or injury to a person
who is committing or at-
tempting to commit a fel-
ony on the property.
* Revises the blood alcohol
threshold relating to
landowner immunity with
regard to intoxicated
trespassers in § 768.075
and broadens the acts to
which such immunity ap-
plies.
" Defines and distinguishes
discovered versus undis-
covered trespassers and
specifies that: 1) with re-
gard to undiscovered
trespassers, a landowner
has only to refrain from
intentional misconduct
and has no duty to warn
of dangerous conditions;
2) with regard to discov-
ered trespassers, a land-
owner must refrain from
gross negligence or inten-
tional misconduct and
must warn the trespasser
of known concealed dan-
gerous conditions.
" Includes within the cate-
gory of "discovered tres-
passers" persons detected
by the landowner, or
about whose presence the
landowner was alerted,
within 24 hours preceding
the accident.
" Immunizes a landowner
from any liability for neg-
ligence causing the death
of or injury to a person
who is committing or at-
tempting to commit a fel-
ony on the property.
Specifies that any person
who trespasses or enters
the property of another
without actualconsent,
any person who commits
a crime against a person
or property of another, or
any person who enters the
property of another while
legally intoxicated, may
not recover damages for
property loss or personal
injury unless that person
can "prove by clear and
convincing evidence that
his or her culpability was
less than the person from
whom recovery is sought."
20. Alcohol and Drug Defene
- Provides that a plaintiff *
who was under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol at
the time of injury cannot
recover any damages for
property or bodily injury
if the plaintiff was more
than 50% at fault for his
or her harm as a result of
the intoxication.
Provides that a plaintiff
who was under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol at
the time of injury cannot
recover any damages for
property or bodily injury
if the plaintiff was more
than 50% at fault for his
or her harm as a result of
the intoxication.
Provides that a defendant
may assert as a defense
that he or she is not liable
to the plaintiff if the
plaintiff was under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol
at the time of injury and
as, a result thereof, the
plaintiff was more than
50% at fault for his or her
injury.
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21. Punitive Damages - Burden of Proof
" Requires plaintiff to prove
entitlement to an award
of punitive damages by
clear and convincing evi-
dence.
" Specifies that the greater
weight of evidence burden
of proof applies to the de-
termination of the
amount of damages.
" Requires plaintiff to prove
entitlement to an award
of punitive damages by
clear and convincing evi-
dence.
" Specifies that the greater
weight of evidence burden
of proof applies to the de-
termination of the
amount of damages.
" Plaintiff cannot claim pu-
nitive damages unless
plaintiff proves by clear
and convincing evidence
that a reasonable basis
exists for recovery of pu-
nitive damages.
" Provides for certiorari re-
view of the procedure and
sufficiency of the evidence
considered by the trier of
fact regarding the deter-
mination of reasonable
basis for the punitive
damages.
22. Punitive Damages - Type of Misconduct Required
" Provides definitions of
"intentional misconduct"
and "gross negligence" in
§ 768.72. Defines "gross
negligence" to require
"conscious disregard or
indifference to the life,
safety or rights" of the in-
jured.
" Immunizes employers
from liability for punitive
damages based on act of
an employee unless the
employer actively partici-
pated in or approved the
conduct or engaged in
grossly negligent conduct
that contributed to the
loss.
" Applies changes to causes
of action arising after Oc-
tober 1, 1999.
" Provides definitions of
"intentional misconduct"
and "gross negligence" in
§ 768.72. Defines "gross
negligence" to require
"conscious disregard or
indifference."
" Immunizes employers
from liability for punitive
damages based on act of
an employee unless the
employer actively partici-
pated in or approved the
conduct or engaged in
grossly negligent conduct
that contributed to the
loss.
" Applies changes to all
civil actions pending on
October 1, 1998, in which
the trial or retrial has not
commenced.
" Prohibits punitive dam-
ages if only compensatory
damages are economic
losses, except in cases of
fraud.
• Allows punitive damages
only where defendant has
been found by clear and
convincing evidence to
have engaged in "inten-
tional misconduct" de-
fined as meaning that the
defendant had actual
knowledge of the wrong-
fulness of the conduct and
the high probability that
injury to the claimant
would result and, despite
that knowledge, inten-
tionally pursued the
course of conduct.
" Allows an award of puni-
tive damages based on vi-
carious liability only if the
person intentionally par-
ticipated in the inten-
tional misconduct or, in
the case of a corporation,
if the officers, directors or
managers intentionally
participated in, or inten-
tionally condoned the in-
tentional misconduct.
" Provides for separate tri-
als on issues of liability
for punitive damages and
amount of punitive dam-
ages. Prohibits evidence
relating solely to punitive
damages from being ad-
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Ch. 99-225, Laws of Fla.
(Became Law)
CS/SB 874 (1998)1 HB 2117 "FAMR" (1997)2
(Enacted/Vetoed) (Died)
mitted until after the trier
of fact has determined de-
fendant's liability for, and
the amount of compensa-
tory damages (which must
be more than nominal).
Applies changes to all
civil actions filed after Oc-
tober 1, 1997.
23. Punitive Damages - Limitations on Damages
" Apparently applies limi-
tations in § 768.73 to all
civil actions instead of
just negligence actions.
" Tiered approach to caps:
0 Punitive damages lim.
ited to greater of
$500,000 or 3 times
compensatory damages;
0 If defendant's wrongful
conduct was motivated
solely by unreasonable
financial gain and de-
fendant had actual
knowledge of the dan-
gerous nature of the
conduct, then punitive
damages are limited to
the greater of
$2,000,000 or 4 times
compensatory damages;
or
0 Where, at the time of
injury, the defendant
had specific intent to
harm the claimant,
there is no limit on pu-
nitive damages.
* Provides that there can be
no more than one punitive
damage award for same
act or single course of
conduct unless the court
determines by clear and
convincing evidence that
the prior award(s) (includ-
ing any state and federal
award) was insufficient to
punish the defendant, in
which case the court may
award punitive damages,
but there is a set-off for
prior awards. Allows the
court to "consider"
whether or not the defen-
dant has ceased the egre-
gious conduct.
" Applies limitations in §
768.73 to all civil actions
instead of just negligence
actions.
" Absolutely limits punitive
damages to $250,000 in
cases where the compen-
satory damages do not ex-
ceed $50,000 and abso-
lutely limits punitive
damages to the greater of
$250,000 or three times
compensatory damages in
cases where the compen-
satory damages exceed
$50,000. Foregoing limita-
tions do not apply if plain-
tiff proves by clear and
convincing evidence that
the defendant engaged in
intentional misconduct
and that the award is not
excessive.
" Provides that there can be
no more than one punitive
damage award for same
act or single course of
conduct unless the court
determines by clear and
convincing evidence that
the prior award(s) (includ-
ing any state and federal
award) was insufficient to
punish the defendant, in
which case the court may
award punitive damages,
but there is a set-off for
prior awards. Allows the
court to "consider"
whether or not the defen-
dant has ceased the egre-
gious conduct.
" Provides that attorney's
fees are payable based on
the entire punitive dam-
ages award.
" Applies changes to all
" Applies limitations in §
768.73 to all civil actions
except contract actions,
instead of just negligence
actions.
• Requires 75% of every
punitive damages award
to be paid to the state to
fund indigent care and
the county courts.
" Provides that there can be
no more than one punitive
damage award for same
act or single course of
conduct unless the court
determines by clear and
convincing evidence that
the prior award(s) (includ-
ing any state and federal
award) was totaly insuf-
ficient to punish the de-
fendant, in which case the
court may award punitive
damages, but there is a
set-off for prior awards.
" Provides that attorney's
fees are payable based on
only the portion of the
punitive damages judg-
ment payable to the
claimant.
" Applies changes to all
civil actions filed after Oc-
tober 1, 1997.
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• Provides that attorney's
fees are payable based on
the final judgment for pu-
nitive damages.
" Applies changes to causes
of action arising after Oc-
tober 1, 1999.
CS/SB 874 (1998)1 HB 2117 -FAIR7 (1997)2
(Enacted/Vetoed) (Died)
civil actions pending on
October 1, 1998 in which
the trial or retrial has not
commenced.
24. Punitive Damages - Exception for Abuse Cases
" Exempts civil actions
based on child abuse,
abuse of the elderly or
abuse of the developmen-
tally disabled and all ac-
tions arising under ch.
400 (nursing homes) from
§768.72(2)-(4), 768.73 and
new burden of proof pro-
visions.
" Provides for a three-times
presumptive punitive
damages cap in such
cases (restates current
law).
* Exempts civil actions
based on child abuse,
abuse of the elderly or
abuse of the developmen-
tally disabled and all ac-
tions arising under ch.
400 (nursing homes) from
§768.72(2)-(4), 768.73 and
new burden of proof pro-
vision#21.
* Provides for a three-times
presumptive punitive
damages cap in such
cases (restates current
law).
25. Punitive Damages - Exception for Intoxication
- Provides an exemption • Provides an exemption * Not addressed.
from the new punitive from the new punitive
damages burden of proof damages burden of proof
requirement and from the requirement and from the
caps on punitive damages caps on punitive damages
for cases where the defen- for cases where the defen-
dant was under the influ- dant was under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol at ence of drugs or alcohol at
the time of the act. the time of the act.
26. Punitive Damages -Arbitration
• Specifies that where puni- * Not addressed. • Not addressed.
tive damages are avail-
able as a remedy in an
arbitration proceeding,
the statutory provisions
on burden of proof, plead-
ing, and caps apply; re-
quires arbitrator to issue
a written opinion.
27. Comparative Fault and Joint & Several Liability
• Tiered threshold/cap ap-
proach to joint and sev-
eral liability for economic
damages. For any defen-
dant whose fault is
greater than the plain-
tiff's:
0 If defendant's fault is 0-
10%, no joint and sev-
eral liability for eco-
* Revises § 768.81 to elimi-
nate application of the
doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability to economic
damages in excess of
$300,000.
" Eliminates application of
the doctrine of joint &
several liability to eco-
nomic damages with re-
* Revises § 768.81 to elimi-
nate the exception which
provides for across-the-
board application of the
doctrine of joint & several
to cases in which the total
damages are $25,000 or
less.
Not addressed.
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nomic damages (0-9% if
plaintiff is faultless);
0 If defendant's fault is
11-24%, $200,000 cap
on economic damages
subject to joint and
several liability (10-
24% and $500,000 if
plaintiff is faultless);
0 If defendant's fault is
25-50%, $500,000 cap
on economic damages
subject to joint and
several liability
($1,000,000 if plaintiff
is faultless); or
0 If defendant's fault is
greater than 50%,
$1,000,000 cap on eco-
nomic damages subject
to joint and several li-
ability ($2,000,000 if
plaintiff is faultless).
0 Specifies that joint Ii-
ability is in addition to
several liability for
economic and none-
conomic damages.
* Eliminates application of
the doctrine of joint &
several to cases under
$25,000.
" Requires a party alleging
the fault ofa nonparty
(per Fabre) to plead same
affirmatively and identify
the nonparty (if known)
by motion or in the initial
responsive pleading when
defenses are first pre-
sented (absent a showing
of good cause). In order
for fault to be apportioned
to the nonparty, defen-
dant must prove the non-
party's fault by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
CS/SB 874 (1998)1
(Enacted/Vetoed)
spect to defendants whose
fault is less than 20%.
Eliminates application of
the doctrine of joint &
several to cases under
$25,000.
Requires a party alleging
the fault of a nonparty
(per Fabre) to plead same
affirmatively by motion or
in the initial responsive
pleading when defenses
are first presented (ab-
sent a showing of good
cause). In order for fault
to be apportioned to the
nonparty, defendant must
prove the nonparty's fault
by a preponderance of the
evidence.
HB 2117 "FAIR" (1997)2
(Died)
28. Vicarious Liability - Motor Vehicles
" Amends § 324.021 to limit * Amends § 324.021 to limit
vicarious liability for all vicarious liability for all
types of vehicles (includ- types of vehicles (includ-
ing rental and privately ing rental and privately
owned cars, trucks and owned cars, trucks and
other types of vehicles) other types of vehicles)
except when used in except when used in
commercial activity, commercial activity; pro-
* Limits vicarious liability vides an exception for
See provision below relat-
ing to elimination of vi-
carious liability for use of
any personal property.
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to $100 per person/300K
per incident plus $500K
additional for economic
damages if the lessee or
operator has less than
$500K insurance (com-
bined limits). Provides a
set-off for all other avail-
able insurance or self-
insurance covering the
lessee or operator.
" Limits do not apply to an
owner of a motor vehicle
used in the owner's ordi-
nary course of business
(except rental car busi-
nesses).
" Limits do not apply to
commercial vehicles being
used to carry hazardous
materials unless at time
of lease the lessee indi-
cates in writing that the
vehicle will not be used
for such transport or the
lessee has $5 million in
insurance coverage.
" Specifies that liability for
the owner's negligence is
not affected.
CS/SB 874 (1998)1
(EnactedVetoed)
HB 2117 "FAIR (1997)2
(Died)
permissive use of a vehi-
cle by a relative residing
in the same household.
" Limits vicarious liability
to $100 per person/300K
per incident plus $500K
additional for economic
damages if the lessee or
operator has less than
$500K insurance (com-
bined limits).
" Provides a set-off for all
other available insurance
or self-insurance covering
the lessee or operator.
" Specifies that liability for
the owner's negligence is
not affected.
e Takes effect duly 1, 9.
29. Other Issues - Joint Employment
e Immunizes an employer 9 Not addressed. * Not addressed.
in a joint employment re-
lationship from liability
for the act of a shared
employee if the individual
joint employer did not au-
thorize or direct the tort-
feasor to take the action
that resulted in the in-
jury.
30. Mediation in Nursing Home Cases
" Revises civil enforcement * Revises civil enforcement * Not addressed.
provisions in § 400.023 to provisions in § 400.023 to
condition recovery of at- condition recovery of at-
torney's fees in actions torney's fees in actions
under Part II of ch. 400 under ch. 400 (nursing
(nursing homes) upon homes) upon participation
participation in pretrial in pretrial mediation.
mediation. Provides that in addition
" Provides that in addition to any other standards for
to any other standards for punitive damages, an
punitive damages, an award must be reasonable
award must be reasonable in light of the actual harm
in light of the actual harm suffered by the resident
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suffered by the resident
and the egregiousness of
the conduct.
CS/SB 874 (1998)1
(Enacted/Vetoed)
HB 2117 "FAIR" (1997)2
(Died)
and the egregiousness of
the conduct.
• Applies to causes of action
accruing on or after Octo-
ber 1. 1998.
31. Mediation in ACLF Cases
Applies the same new . Not addressed. * Not addressed.
mediation requirements
regarding nursing home
to the civil enforcement
provisions relating to as-
sisted living facilities
regulated under Part III
of ch. 400.
32. Mediation in Adult Family Care Home Cases
Applies the same new * Not addressed. * Not addressed.
mediation requirements
regarding nursing homes
to the civil enforcement
provisions relating to
adult family-care homes
regulated under Part VII
ofch. 400.
33. Actuarial Study & Rate Filing
" Requires OPPAGA to con- * Requires the Department * Not addressed.
tract for an actuarial of Insurance to contract
analysis of the expected for an actuarial analysis
savings from the act. of the expected savings
* Requires the analysis to from the act to be corn-
include an estimate of the pleted by March 1, 2001.
percentage decrease in Requires the Department
judgments, settlements to review insurance rates
and costs, including the and require prospective
time period when the say- rate modifications consis-
ings are expected. tent with the report.
" Report is not required to Does not apply to private
be completed until March passenger automobile in-
1. 07. surance or personal lines
residential property in-
surance.
34. Article V. Conflict
- Specifies that if any court
finds that any provision of
the act encroaches on the
authority of the Florida
Supreme Court to deter-
mine rules of practice and
procedure, then the provi-
sion is to be considered a
request to the Court to
change its rule and not a
mandatory legislative di-
rective.
- Not addressed. Not addressed.
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(Enacted/Vetoed) (Died)
35. Severability
- Specifies that the invalid- Specifies that the invalid. * Specifies that the invalid-
ity of one provision does ity of one provision does ity of one provision does
not affect the validity of not affect the validity of not affect the validity of
other provisions, other provisions, other provisions.
36. Effective Date
" Takes effect October 1, * Takes effect October 1, * Takes effect October 1,
1999, except as otherwise 1998. 1997.
provided. * See special effective - See special effective
" See special effective date/applicability provi- date/applicability provi-
date/applicability provi- sions relating to punitive sions relating to punitive
sions relating to statute of damages and motor vehi- damages.
repose, punitive damages, cle vicarious liability.
and motor vehicle vicari-
ous liability.
B. 1997 and 1998 Issues that Are Not in the 1999 Bil
Hearsay Exception
o Not addressed. (Moot- - Revises § 90.803(22) to * Not addressed in HB
passed in 1997 and 1998 provide for the admissibil- 2117; however, this provi-
as a separate bill. See ity of previous testimony sion was the subject of a
note under HB 2117.) given in the same or a dif- separate 1997 bill that ul-
ferent proceeding if the timately became law in
party against whom the 1998 after a veto over-
testimony is offered, a ride.4
predecessor in interest or
a person with a similar
interest had an opportu-
nity to examine the wit-
ness.
3
Offers of Judgment
* Not addressed. * Specifies that, for pur- * Not addressed.
poses of § 768.79, offers in
multiple party cases must
specify the party to whom
the offer is directed and
allows party to accept or
reject only the applicable
offer.
Specifies that a subse-
quent offer voids a previ-
ous offer.
3. This provision was probably included in the bill as a backup measure since the exact
same provision had already passed in 1997 but had been vetoed by Gov. Chiles. Although, ulti-
mately, the veto was overridden, that vote could not occur until the Legislature met in the Ses-
sion, long after development work on the 1998 tort reform bills had begun. See the following
note.
4. CS/HB 1597 (1997), was enacted by the Legislature but then vetoed by Gov. Chiles. The
veto was overridden by the Legislature at the beginning of the 1998 Session. HB 1597 was origi-
nally filed by Rep. John Thrasher, the man who was to become Speaker of the House in Novem-
ber, 1998. Not surprisingly, the bill came to the House floor for a vote on the override opening
day of the 1998 Session. The change is now codified in § 90.803(22), Fla. Stat. (1998 Supp.).
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*Requires a court, prior to
awarding costs and fees,
to determine whether the
offer was reasonable un-
der the circumstances
known at the time the of-
fer was made.
Attorney Advertising
" Not addressed.
" Not addressed.
" Provides a declaration of
state policy and findings
regarding advertising (es-
pecially electronic) by at-
torneys.
" Requests the Florida Su-
preme Court and The
Florida Bar to regulate
advertising in a limited
manner to advance the
policy.
" Requests The Florida Bar
to form a task force to ad-
dress the adoption of
rules prohibiting advertis-
ing by members of its vol-
untary sections.
" Requests the Florida Su-
preme Court to consider
adopting rules to effectu-
ate the state policy re-
garding attorney advertis-
ing.
Vicarious Liability for Use of Personal Property
* See provision above limit- @ See provision above li
ing the vicarious liability
of motor vehicle owners.
mit-
ing the vicarious liability
of motor vehicle owners.
Creates new § 768.291 to
immunize the owner of
any personal property
from vicarious liability for
the acts of another person
using or operating the
property if the use or op-
eration is covered by in-
surance with limits of at
least $100,0001$300,000
bodily injury liability and
$50,000 property damage
liability or at least
$500,000 combined limits.
Specifies that the owner
does not have a duty to
warn a user of the prop-
erty as to either a defect
that is or should be ap-
parent to an ordinary
user of the property or
any defect that is not
known to the owner of the
property.
" Not addressed
" Not addressed.
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Vicarious Liability for Intentional Torts
Not addressed. • Not addressed. Creates § 768.37 to spec-
ify that the doctrine of vi-
carious liability cannot be
used to impose liability
against a defendant for
any civil damages when
the damages were caused
by an intentional tort
committed by a third
party.
Drug Dealer Liability Act
Not addressed. (Moot-
passed in 1997 as a sepa-
rate bill. See note under
HB 2117.)
Not addressed. (Moot-
passed in 1997 as a sepa-
rate bill. See note under
HB 2117.)
Creates a cause of action
for treble damages based
upon a plaintiff who is in-
jured by a defendant's ac-
tions when those actions
also result in the defen-
dant's conviction for a
drug related crime. Pro-
vides for recovery from
the parents of a minor if
the parents were aware of
or recklessly disregarded
facts demonstrating that
the minor intended to
commit the offense. Pro-
vides for recovery of costs
and attorney's fees.5
5. This same provision was enacted separately in CS/SBs 474 & 764 (1997); ch. 97-80,
Laws of Fla.; now codified at § 772.12, FLA. STAT. (1998 Supp.).
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